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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

DOUGLAS L. STOWELL, PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
GARY W. OSTLER, deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 20050636-SC

vs.
OSTLER INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Utah
corporation; OSTLER PROPERTY
DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation;
DALE OSTLER; and VYRON OSTLER,
Defendants and Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES OSTLER INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND
OSTLER PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT, INC.

I. STATEMENT CONCERNING JURISDICTION
This case is an appeal of an order of dismissal entered by the Third Judicial
District Court. This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-2-2(j).
II. CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Copies of controlling statutory provisions are included in Addendum No. 1
attached to this brief, and include the following:

UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH
UTAH

CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.

§ 16-10a-728
§ l6-10a-732
§ 16-10a-801
§ 16-10a-805
§ 16-10a-810
§ 25-5-4
§ 25-5-8

III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. ISSUES PRESENTED

1.

Whether UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732 is mandatory and unambiguously

dictates that a shareholder agreement providing for management of a corporation in a
manner inconsistent with the Utah Corporation Act is invalid if not in writing.
(Preserved for appeal at Record on Appeal ("ROA") pp. 39-52, 322-323.)
2.

Whether UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732 requires that a shareholder

agreement providing for management of a corporation in a manner inconsistent with the
Utah Corporation Act expires after ten years when the term agreed upon by the parties in
the alleged agreement is indefinite. (Preserved for appeal at ROA pp. 113-138, 322-323.)
3.

Whether an alleged shareholder agreement providing for the management

of a corporation in a manner inconsistent with the Utah Corporation Act is inheritable
when the agreement would require a personal relationship among shareholders in
managing the corporation, including establishing and implementing all company policies
and programs, developing business ventures, and making decisions concerning the use of
profits. (Preserved for appeal at ROA pp. 39-52, 324.)
4.

Whether the trial court properly dismissed the Estate's Claims when the

Estate concedes that all claims for damages are barred by UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(1)

and the equitable remedy of specific performance is not available to compel parties to
engage in a personal relationship of trust in managing and operating a business.
(Preserved for appeal at ROA pp. 272-275.)
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court dismissed the complaint in this matter pursuant to UTAH RULE
Civ. P. 12(b)6.

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)6 is reviewed for

correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's decision. Educators Mutual Ins.
Ass 'n. v. Allied Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995).

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff/Appellant in this matter is Douglas Stowell, an attorney who is acting
as the personal representative of the estate of Gary Ostler (the Plaintiff/Appellant is
hereinafter referred to as the "Estate" and Gary Ostler is hereinafter referred to as
"Gary"). After Gary's death, the Estate brought this action against Gary's brother, Dale
Ostler

(hereinafter

"Dale"),

another

brother

Vyron

Ostler

("Vyron"),

and

Defendants/Appellees Ostler International, Inc. and Ostler Property Development, Inc.
(these companies are hereinafter referred to as the "Corporate Defendants").

The

complaint seeks to enforce an alleged oral agreement between Dale and Gary, as
shareholders, concerning how the Corporate Defendants would be managed. The trial
court granted the motions to dismiss filed by Dale, Vyron, and the Corporate Defendants,
and this appeal followed.
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court concluded that (1) The shareholder
agreement alleged in the complaint would purport to permit the Corporate Defendants "to

operate outside of the requirements" of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act
(hereinafter the "Corporation Act") (ROA, p. 322-323)1; (2)

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 16-

10a-732(2) is mandatory, and requires that the kind of shareholder agreement alleged in
the complaint "shall be" in writing to be in enforceable

(Id); (3)

Even

if the

shareholder agreement were otherwise enforceable, UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732(2)
provides that the kind of shareholder agreement alleged in the complaint would expire
after ten years unless the parties agreed to a different term (Id); (4) The agreement as
alleged in the complaint was personal to Gary and Dale and ended when Gary died (ROA
p. 324).
The complaint in this matter alleges an oral agreement between Dale and Gary,
dating from the time the Corporate Defendants were incorporated, that neither of the
Corporate Defendants would implement any policy or business practice without the
consent of both Gary and Dale as shareholders. The complaint bases the alleged oral
agreement at least in part upon "custom, usage, and course of dealing," (Id. at ^ | 27 &
33, ROA, pp. 7-8 & 10-11). Ostler International was incorporated in 1988 and Ostler
Property was incorporated in 1993. (Id at ffl| 8 & 9, ROA pp. 2 & 3). Dale and Gary
each owned fifty percent of the stock of the Corporate Defendants. (Complaint, ^ 3-4,
ROA p. 2.2)
After Gary's death, Dale appointed Vyron to fill Gary's vacant seat on the boards
of directors of the Corporate Defendants. (ROA, pp. 42-43.) In the Complaint, the Estate

1
2

A copy of the trial court's decision is attached as Addendum No. 2.
The Complaint is attached hereto as Addendum No. 3.

claims to be the successor in interest to the alleged agreement between Dale and Gary,
and asserts that since Gary's death, Dale, Vyron, and the Corporate Defendants have not
permitted the Estate to participate in the management of the companies. (Id. at \ 25,
ROA, pp. 6-7) The Estate requests damages as well as an order compelling the Corporate
Defendants to permit the Estate to participate in adopting and implementing all business
decisions and practices of the Corporate Defendants, including decisions concerning the
use of profits. (Id. at f t 31 & 37, ROA pp. 9 &11).
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Estate concedes that its complaint in this matter is premised upon an alleged
shareholder agreement that provided for a manner of governing the Corporate Defendants
that is inconsistent with the Corporation Act. The agreement is inconsistent with the
Corporation Act because the agreement provided for the management of the Corporate
Defendants by their shareholders rather than by a board of directors. The Corporation
Act requires that corporations "must" have a board of directors and the directors "shall"
manage corporations.

Because the shareholder agreement is inconsistent with the

Corporation Act, the agreement is only enforceable and valid if it complies with UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 16-10a-732.

Section 732 requires that shareholder agreements that are inconsistent with the
Corporation Act "shall" be in writing. Section 732 further requires that unless the parties
agree to a different term, shareholder agreements that are inconsistent with the
Corporation Act will expire after ten years.

Section 732 uses the mandatory word

"shall," and courts are left with no choice but to apply the plain language of a mandatory

statute. The shareholder agreement alleged in the complaint is invalid because it was not
in writing. In addition, even if it were enforceable, it has expired under the ten year term
imposed by the statute.
Because § 732 is clear and unambiguous, the Court need not look to secondary
sources, such as the official commentary, to construe it.

In any event, the official

commentary supports the trial court's determination that the shareholder agreement is
unenforceable. According to the official commentary, one of the purposes of § 732 is to
provide "predictability" and "legal certainty" concerning shareholder agreements. The
statute seeks to obtain this goal by requiring a written agreement setting out the terms of
the agreement. The oral shareholder agreement alleged in the complaint, which is based
upon "custom, usage, and course of dealing," does not comport with the statute's purpose
of obtaining "predictability" and "legal certainty" through a written agreement.
The Estate's position in this case is premised upon the assumption that the alleged
agreement between Gary and Dale is inheritable as a matter of law. This position is in
error.

Some contract rights are personal to the holder and may not be inherited or

assigned, including rights where personal needs and trust are dominant. The Estate's
complaint in this matter asserts that Gary and Dale agreed to operate the Corporate
Defendants informally, similar to a partnership. This may be permissible as long as the
agreement complies with UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732.

However, the right to

participate in management of a business as a partner is highly personal in nature, and
should not be involuntarily imposed upon anyone. The Estate's position would lead to an

absurd and unworkable result, requiring that the heirs of Gary and Dale are forever
compelled to engage in a personal relationship of trust in managing the business.
The only potential remedy at issue in this case is whether the Estate may obtain an
order of specific performance requiring Dale and the heirs of Gary to work together in
managing the business of the Corporate Defendants. The Estate agrees that any damage
claim it may have is barred by the statute of frauds as found in UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-54(1), thus leaving at issue only the claims seeking specific performance. However, courts
refuse to order specific performance of agreements, such as partnership agreements, that
would require parties to work together in personal relationships of trust.

Courts also

decline to order specific performance when to do so would impose a heavy burden of
ongoing judicial supervision and intervention.

Requiring unwilling parties to work

together perpetually as partners is obviously problematic. It will result in uncertainty and
contention related to the management of the Corporate Defendants and will require
ongoing judicial intervention.
VI. ARGUMENT
A. UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732 is MANDATORY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY DICTATES
THAT A SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR MANAGEMENT OF A
CORPORATION IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE CORPORATION A C T IS
INVALID IF N O T IN WRITING.

The Estate's Complaint in this matter attempts to allege an oral agreement
whereby Gary and Dale, as shareholders of the corporations, would always manage the
companies jointly, and the companies could not implement any policy or business
decision without the consent of both. As conceded by the Estate, these allegations assert

an oral shareholder agreement concerning how the companies would be managed that is
not consistent with the Corporation Act.

Since this oral management agreement is

inconsistent with the Corporation Act, the plain language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 16- 10a732 dictates that it is invalid because it is not in writing. The language of § 732 is clear
and unambiguous, and the court need not resort to secondary sources to construe the
statute. In any event, even if secondary sources are considered, the official commentary
to the statute supports the position that oral shareholder agreements inconsistent with the
Corporation Act are invalid.
1. The Alleged Shareholder Agreement is Not Consistent with the Corporation Act
The Corporation Act outlines how corporations are created and managed. The Act
provides that shareholders elect directors, and directors, not shareholders, manage
corporations. Section 801 of the Act provides as follows:
(1) Except as provided in Section 16-10a-732, each corporation must have a
board of directors.
(2) All corporate power shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and
the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction
of, its board of directors, subject to any limitations set forth in the
articles of incorporation or in an agreement authorized under Section
16-10a-732.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 16-10a-801.

The Corporation Act includes a comprehensive mechanism that outlines how
directors are appointed. It provides that directors' terms expire at annual shareholder

3

In the trial court, the parties and the court addressed issues concerning the retroactive
application of UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732. The Estate has not addressed this issue in
its opening brief, and thereby has waived any argument with respect to this issue.
Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 80 P.3d 546, 500 n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).

meetings. UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-805. Shareholders are also entitled to participate
in elections for directors. Section 728 of the Corporation Act provides that in electing
directors, each shareholder is entitled to one vote for each share and "has the right to cast
. . . all of the votes to which the shareholder's shares are entitled for as many persons as
there are directors to be elected and for whose election the shareholder has the right to
vote."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 16-10a-728(l). In addition, the Act provides that "directors

are elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to vote in the election."
Id.
The Act also addresses how director seats are filled in the event a vacancy occurs
before an annual meeting at which directors are elected. The Act provides that the board
of directors may fill the vacancy. UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-810(l)(b). The Act also
addresses what would happen in the event directors are not elected at annual meetings,
stating that a director appointed prior to the meeting "continues to serve until the election
and qualification of a successor." Id. at § 16-10a-805(5).
Thus, ownership of shares gives shareholders the right to participate in elections
for directors, but not necessarily the right to participate in managing a company.
Management is exclusively within the power of directors, and ownership of shares does
not assure appointment to the board. Therefore, as the Estate concedes, the shareholder
agreement alleged in the complaint is not consistent with the Corporation Act.
2. Because the Alleged Shareholder Agreement is Not Consistent with the Corporation
Act, the Mandatory Language of§§ 732 and 801 Dictates that the Agreement is
Invalid Because it is Not in Writing.

As noted above, § 801 of the Corporation Act mandates that all corporations
"must have a board of directors" and "[a] 11 corporate powers shall be exercised by or
under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the
direction of, its board of directors . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-801 (emphasis
added). Section 801 also states that "an agreement authorized under Section 16-10a-732"
may create an exception to the ordinary rule of management by the board of directors. Id.
Section 732 of the Corporation Act outlines how shareholders may establish a
structure for corporate management that is different from what is outlined in § 801.
Subsection one of § 732 states that
(1) An agreement among the shareholders of a corporation that complies
with this section is effective among the shareholders and the
corporation even though it is inconsistent with one or more other
provisions of this chapter . . .
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 16-10a-732(l).

Subsection one of § 732 then outlines, by

illustration, the types of agreements that may be the subject of a valid shareholder
agreement. Subsection one, for example, authorizes agreements that eliminate the board
of directors or restrict its powers. It also authorizes agreements that establish different
procedures for selecting directors and establishing their terms of service. Notably, § 732
applies to agreements that are "inconsistent" with the Corporation Act. In other words,
§ 732 is broad and its applicability is not limited to those circumstances where a
shareholder agreement is not only inconsistent but also invalid and unenforceable due to
the inconsistency.

Subsection two of § 732 establishes formal requirements for putting in place a
shareholders' agreement that is inconsistent with the statutory requirement that
corporations "must" have a board of directors and directors "shall" manage all affairs of
corporations. Subsection two states as follows:
(2) An agreement authorized by this section shall be:
(a) set forth:
(i) in the articles of incorporation or bylaws and approved by
all persons who are shareholders at the time of the agreement; or
(ii) in a written agreement that is signed by all persons who
are shareholders at the time of the agreement and is made known to
the corporation;
(b) subject to amendment only by all persons who are
shareholders at the time of the amendment, unless the agreement
provides otherwise; and
(c) valid for 10 years, unless the agreement provides otherwise.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 16-10a-732(2). Notably, similar to § 801, this subsection uses the

mandatory phrase "shall" in describing the legislature's intent.
Despite § 732's mandate that shareholder agreements by in writing, the Estate
argues that § 732 of the Corporation Act does not invalidate the alleged oral management
agreement described in the complaint. The Estate contends that § 732 merely validates
agreements that comply with § 732's provisions, but does not, on the other hand,
invalidate agreements that fail to comply with § 732. The Estate argues that the intent of
the statutory provisions is merely to validate written agreements, and leaves open the
question of whether oral agreements are valid. The estate contends that the validity of
oral agreements "depends on their terms and other contractual formalities and the
performance of the shareholders in response thereto." (Appellant's Brief, p. 14.) This
assertion is contrary to the clear language of the Corporation Act.

In construing a statute, a court is required to apply the plain language of the
statute. A court is required to "presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and
give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Nelson v. Salt
Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). When the language employed by the
legislature "is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no
room is left for construction." Id. (quoting Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic,
Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995)). The court will examine secondary
sources such as statutory history and relevant policy considerations only if the statute is
ambiguous. Id.
In the present case, the language of the relevant statutory provisions is plain and
unambiguous. The statutory provisions provide that shareholders have the right to elect
directors, but not to manage corporations. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-728. The
provisions further provide that a corporation "must have a board of directors" and that
"all corporate powers shall be exercised by the board." Id. at § 801 (emphasis added).
Although the Corporation Act authorizes an exception to this ordinary mandate for board
governance, the Corporation Act dictates that such a shareholder agreement "shalF be in
writing. Id. at § 732 (emphasis added).
The legislature's use of the mandatory words "shall" and "must" cannot be
ignored. The word "shall," as used in the statute, is "usually presumed mandatory and
has been interpreted as such previously in this and other jurisdictions." Pugh v. Draper
City, 114 P.3d 546, f 13 (Utah 2005). Similarly, the word "must" when used in statutes
has been given a mandatory interpretation. Provo City v. Hanson, 601 P.2d 141, 143

(Utah 1979). As one court noted, "where a statute uses the mandatory language 'shall/ a
court must obey the statute and has no right to make the law contrary to what the
legislature prescribed." Merrill v. Jansrna, 86 P.3d 270, 288 (Wyo. 2004).
Courts strictly apply statutes that employ mandatory language. For example, in
Pugh v. Draper, 114 P.3d 546 (Utah 2005), the court construed statutory provisions
requiring candidates for municipal elections to file financial disclosures. The statutory
provisions construed by the court required that city recorders "shall" remove from ballots
the names of candidates that failed to file the appropriate disclosures.

Noting the

legislature's use of the mandatory word "shall," the court upheld the city recorders'
actions in removing the candidate's name from the ballot due to failure to comply with
the statutory requirement. Id. atff 12-13.
Courts have applied a similar method of strict construction in the context of
corporate statutes and contracts. In Farr v. Brikerhoff, 829 P.2d 117 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), the court considered statutory provisions governing the sale of corporate assets.
The relevant statutory provisions required that before completing a sale of substantially
all of a corporation's assets, 1) the board "shall" adopt a resolution recommending the
sale; 2) written notice "shall" be given to shareholders; and 3) a majority of the
shareholders "shall" vote in favor of the sale. Id. p. 121. The court of appeals concluded
that a purported sale of corporate assets was invalid because it failed to comply with the
statute.
In short, mandatory statutory language is ordinarily strictly applied and usually
requires the invalidation of actions or contracts that are inconsistent with the statute. See

Patterson v. Alpine City, 663 P.2d 95, 96 (Utah 1983) (municipal sewer connection fee'
invalid because statutory requirement that "all resolutions shall be in writing is
mandatory") (emphasis in original); Davis v. Heath Development Co., 558 P.2d 594, 596
(Utah 1976) (corporate contract that was not approved as required by statute was invalid);
Parr v. Stubbs, 117 P.3d 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (ordering dismissal of lien
nullification proceeding because of plaintiffs failure to comply with mandatory
requirements of statute).
The Estate misses the mark when it argues that § 732 merely validates written
shareholder agreements but does not invalidate oral shareholder agreements. The Estate
concedes, as it must, that the alleged shareholder agreement does not comply with the
various statutory provisions that outline how corporations are governed. At pages 18 and
19 of its opening brief, the Estate asserts that the shareholder agreements "conflict with a
number of the sections of the Revised Act." As noted above, the alleged agreement
providing that Gary and Dale, as shareholders, would manage the corporations is not
consistent with the statutory mandate that corporations "must" have a board of directors
and "shall" be managed by the board. The legislature chose to carve out an exception
through § 732 whereby shareholders could agree to alternative management structures.
However, without the exception in § 732, any shareholder agreement, whether written or
oral, providing for a form of corporate governance that is contrary to the Corporation Act
would be suspect and subject to challenge.

Clearly, the legislature intended that

shareholder agreements with alternative management arrangements would only be valid
if they comply with § 732. Absent an agreement that conforms to § 732, a corporation

has no choice but to comply with the mandate that it "must" have a board of directors and
the board "shall" manage the company. Any such agreement purporting to establish a
management structure contrary to the Corporation Act is presumptively invalid, and must
look to § 732 for validation.
The trial court's interpretation of § 732 is consistent with well-established
principles of statutory construction. This Court has endorsed, as an aid to statutory
interpretation, the principle of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Monson v. Carver,
928 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Utah 1996). This phrase means "the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another." Id. at 1025 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th Ed.
1990)). This Court has stated that this principle will apply if "in the natural association
of ideas the contrast between a specific subject matter which is expressed and one which
is not mentioned leads to an inference that the latter was not intended to be included
within the statute." Id. (quoting Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah
1993)). Applying this principle, courts have held that "if a statute specifies under what
conditions it is effective, we can ordinarily infer that it excludes all others." Pam
Transport v. Freightliner Corp., 893 P.2d 1295 (Ariz. 1995). See also Rectenwald v.
Snider, 894 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Ore. Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied 907 P.2d 247 ("When a
statute limits something to be done in a particular form, it necessarily implies in itself a
negative, i.e., that the thing shall not be done otherwise.")
In the present case, the legislature expressly mandates a form for corporate
governance that requires that a board of directors manage corporations. The legislature
has also provided for an exception to the ordinary manner of corporate governance only

through an agreement that complies with § 732.

Section 732 dictates that such an

agreement "shall" be in writing. By expressly outlining a form for corporate governance
and a specific process for deviating from that form, the legislature quite clearly excluded
the validity of agreements that fail to comply with § 732.
The Corporate Defendants' interpretation of § 732 is consistent with the
interpretation given a similar statute by the Maine Supreme Court in Villar v. Kernan,
695 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1997). In Villar, the court held that an oral shareholder agreement
was invalid, noting that the agreement "must meet the [statute's] specifications and
therefore must be in writing to be enforceable." Id. at 1224.
In construing statutes, courts have a "duty to avoid interpreting a statute in a
manner that renders portions of the statute, or related statutes, meaningless." Lyon v.
Burton, 5 P.3d 616, ^ 19 n. 5 (Utah 1996). In the present case, the legislature has
mandated a form of corporate governance, subject only to the exception found in § 732.
Section 732 mandates that any shareholder agreement changing the form of corporate
governance "shall" be in writing. If the court were to adopt the Estate's interpretation of
§ 732, the statutory requirement for written shareholder agreements would be
meaningless. If the Estate's position were to be adopted, an oral agreement would be just
as valid as a written agreement, and the requirement in § 732(2) for a written document
would be pointless.
3. The Court Should Not by Judicial Decision Create an Equitable Exception to
§ 732's Mandatory Requirements.

The Estate appears also to argue that the Court should overlook the mandatory
language of § 732 because the alleged shareholder agreement was partly performed, and
it would be inequitable not to enforce the agreement. This assertion has no factual basis
in the allegations of the Complaint. At issue is the right of Gary's heirs to participate in
management.

The Complaint does not even allege that Dale and Gary reached an

agreement whereby their heirs would manage the companies after either's death.
Similarly, the Complaint doesn't allege that such an agreement was partly reformed.
In any event, § 732 does not include a part performance exception. Obviously, the
legislature knows how to create a part performance exception because it has done so in
the Statute of Frauds. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-8 (remedy of specific performance is
available with respect to an agreement otherwise barred by the statute of frauds if the
agreement was partly performed).
The Court should not by judicial action effectively amend the statute to include a
part performance exception because courts lack power to ignore mandatory statutory
requirements based upon equitable considerations. Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 670
(Utah 1992) (court "does not have the authority to ignore existing principles of law in
favor of its view of the equities."); see also Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 649, 650 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987), aff d 758 P.2d 905 (Utah 1988) (mandatory requirement for interest on
judgment could not be ignored on equitable grounds because "when principles of equity
confront rules of law, 'equity follows the law.'") (quoting McDermott v. McDermott, 628
P.2d 959, 960 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).

4. The Official Commentary to § 732 Need Not Be Considered Because the Statute is
Unambiguous, but Even if Considered, it Supports the Trial Court's Dismissal of
the Complaint.
The Estate argues that § 732 is ambiguous and the Court should look to the official
commentary in order to construe the statute. This argument is in error, as set forth above.
Accordingly, the Court should apply the plain language of the statute and it is
unnecessary for the Court to even consider the official commentary. In any event, even if
considered, neither the official commentary nor policy considerations support the Estate's
interpretation of the statute.
Section 732(1) outlines, by illustration, the subject matter of potential agreements
that § 732 validates. Section 732(2) then outlines the formal requirements for such an
agreement. The official commentary, in discussing § 732(1), states that the definition of
potential subjects for agreements, as outlined in Subsection 1, is illustrative only, and not
exclusive, stating:
Section 732(1) defines the range of permissible subject matter for
shareholder agreements largely by illustration, enumerating seven types of
agreements that are expressly validated to the extent they would not be
valid absent section 732. The enumeration of these types of agreements is
not exclusive; nor should it give rise to a negative inference that an
agreement of a type that is or might be embraced by one of the categories of
subsection 732(1) is, ipso facto, a type of agreement that is not valid unless
it complies with Section 732. Section 732(1) also contains a "catch-all"
which adds a measure of flexibility to the seven enumerated categories.
(Official Commentary, p. 338, attached as Addendum 4). The Estate reads the abovereferenced portion of the commentary to mean that an agreement is not necessarily
invalid because of failure to comply with the requirements of § 732(2), including the
requirement that an agreement be in writing. However, there is no reference to the

specific requirements of Subsection 2 in this portion of the commentary. This portion of
the commentary does not at all state that oral agreements are valid under § 732. Rather,
this section of the commentary only states that the permissible range of subjects as
outlined in § 732(1) is not exclusive, and other kinds of agreements not expressly
described in § 732(1) may also be validated by the statute, even though not specifically
referenced in subsection one. In short, this portion of the commentary only addresses the
potential subjects which a shareholder agreement may address. It does not address the
formal requirements for a shareholder agreement as outlined in subsection two or the
result of failure to comply with those requirements.
The Estate's argument is also inconsistent with other portions of the official
commentary. The official commentary provides that § 732 "adds an important element of
predictability previously absent from the Model Act and affords participants in closely
held corporations greater contractual freedom to tailor the rules of their enterprise." Id. at
p. 338. The commentary further states that its purpose is to add "legal certainty" to
certain types of shareholder agreements. Id. The official commentary further provides
that the section "minimizes the formal requirements for a shareholder agreement" and
states that "the principal requirements are simply that the agreement be in writing and be
approved or agreed to by all persons who are shareholders."

Id. at p. 339.

The

commentary notes that a written agreement signed by all shareholders is desirable, even if
the agreement is contained in the company's bylaws, because it would "establish
unequivocally" the agreement. Id.

It is apparent from the commentary that the purpose of § 732 is twofold: (1) to
allow shareholders in closely held corporations greater contractual freedom as to how
their enterprise will be governed; and (2) to increase predictability and legal certainty
concerning shareholder relationships and the governance of closely held corporations. To
carry out these purposes, the official commentary states that § 732 includes minimal
formal requirements, but those formal requirements do include that the agreement be in
writing.
The Estate's construction of § 732 is contrary to the statute's stated purpose of
obtaining predictability and legal certainty through a written agreement approved by all
shareholders. Contrary to the intent of the statute as outlined in the commentary, the
Estate would have the trial court examine years of interaction between the shareholders in
an attempt to infer a shareholders agreement based upon "custom, usage, and course of
dealing." (Complaint, f 27, ROA p. 7.) Resolving the issues raised in the complaint
under the standard urged by the Estate will require extended, complicated legal
proceedings.
If the Estate were successful in obtaining the relief it requests in the complaint, the
confusion and uncertainty would increase.

Even as alleged by the Estate in the

complaint, the terms of the alleged shareholder agreement are indefinite and unwieldy.
This is plainly evident from the relief requested. In the complaint, the Estate requests an
order requiring that "Plaintiff and Plaintiffs successors and assigns . . . be involved in the
formulation and implementation of policies for the conducting of the business of [the
companies]" and further requiring that the companies "neither adopt or implement

policies or conduct business of the companies to which Plaintiff or his successors and
assigns are not in agreement."

(Id. f 59(a), ROA pp. 18-19.) In short, the Estate

requests that Dale and the heirs of Gary become involuntary partners in the management
of the businesses. This will result in a morass of confusion and contention concerning
what business decisions require the Estate's consent.
The result urged by the Estate is very different from the predictable written
agreement contemplated by § 732, and is contrary to the goal of "legal certainty"
envisioned by the commentary.
B. UTAH CODE ANN, § 16-10a-732 REQUIRES THAT A SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT
PROVIDING FOR MANAGEMENT OF A CORPORATION IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT
WITH THE CORPORATION A C T EXPIRES AFTER TEN YEARS WHEN THE TERM
AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES IN THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT IS INDEFINITE,

The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that even if there were an
enforceable shareholders agreement along the lines argued by the Estate, it could not
endure beyond ten years pursuant to § 732(2). Section 732(2) provides that shareholder
agreements are "valid for ten years, unless the agreement provides otherwise." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732(2)(c). The Estate argues that this provision has no application,
asserting that
there was no factual basis from which the trial court could properly
conclude that Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler had not agreed that the terms of
their agreements would extend for so long as each owned 50% of the
capital shares of the companies, both intending and understanding that term
may extend in excess often years.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 24.) The Estate, however, can cite no allegation in the Complaint
which alleges that Gary and Dale Ostler agreed that the alleged shareholder agreement

would extend beyond ten years. Rather, the allegations in the Complaint, at best, allege
an agreement with an undefined term. The Estate appears to argue that the ten year
default term in § 732 does not apply because Gary and Dale agreed that the term of their
agreement would extend indefinitely.

In other words, the Estate argues that § 732's

condition of "unless the agreement provides otherwise" is satisfied because Gary and
Dale's agreement allegedly included an indefinite term. This interpretation of the statute
is contrary to its clear language.
Section 732 contemplates that shareholders (in a written agreement) may define
the duration of their agreement.

In the event the shareholders do not do so, § 732

imposes by default a term often years. Since, as the Estate concedes, Gary and Dale did
not define the duration of the agreement, § 732's default term applies.
The Estate attempts to turn the agreement into a perpetual, unending agreement
because Gary and Dale did not define a specific term for the alleged agreement.
However, that is not how the law treats agreements for which the parties do not define a
term. Contracts that do not specify a duration are "generally presumed to be terminable
at will." Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 54 P.3d 1165, ^ 21 (Utah 2002); see
also Midwest Energy Consultants v. Covenant Home, 815 N.E.2d 911,915 (111. Ct. App.
2004) (consulting agreement of indefinite duration terminable at will); Santa Fe Custom
Shutters and Doorss Inc. v. Home^Depot USA, 113 P.3d 347, 358 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005),
cert, denied 113 P.3d 345 (N.M. 2005) (holding under UCC that contract of indefinite

duration is terminable at will).4 If the statutory term of ten years does not apply, either
Gary or Dale would be free to terminate the agreement at any time. If the agreement
were transferable, then successors to Gary and Dale would have the same right.
C. AN ALLEGED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF
A CORPORATION IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE CORPORATION A C T IS
N O T INHERITABLE WHEN THE AGREEMENT WOULD REQUIRE A PERSONAL
RELATIONSHIP AMONG SHAREHOLDERS IN MANAGING THE CORPORATION,
INCLUDING ESTABLISHING AND IMPLEMENTING ALL COMPANY POLICIES AND
PROGRAMS, DEVELOPING BUSINESS VENTURES, AND MAKING DECISIONS
CONCERNING THE USE OF PROFITS.

The Complaint assumes, as a matter of law, that the Estate, as the successor in
interest to Gary's stock, is entitled to enforce the alleged shareholder agreement. The
Complaint does not allege that Gary and Dale agreed that after their death their heirs
would be subject to the same agreement.

Rather, the Complaint presumes that the

shareholder agreement is inheritable as a matter of law. This assumption, however, is in
error.
It is well established that not every right is assignable or inheritable.
[R]ights or interests which are personal to the deceased are not inheritable
and ordinarily are not subject to descent and distribution. Such rights
include a personal right to use land, a personal power of appointment,
personal option, a statutory right to contest a will, a grantor's right to take
advantage of the breach of a condition subsequent in a deed, a tenancy at
will, or an estate for life.
26B CJS Descent and Distribution § 9 (2001). The Estate can cite no case law providing
that the authority and fiduciary duty ordinarily conferred upon directors to manage
4

Although not controlling, the Utah Uniform Commercial Code is persuasive by analogy.
It provides "where the contract provides for successive performances but is indefinite in

corporations may be assigned or inherited. Indeed, the fiduciary duties imposed upon
directors are "non-delegable." Auerbach v Bennett, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928 (N.Y. 1979).
Utah law recognizes that not all rights are assignable or inheritable. For example,
this Court has held that a professional degree is "highly personal" and "terminates on
death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, or
conveyed, or pledged." Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1991) (quoting In
re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Utah 1978)). Utah case law has found that in
some circumstances the rights created by contract are personal in nature and cannot be
transferred. For example, in Maw v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, 436 P.2d
230 (Utah 1968), the court held that a contract which granted hunting privileges to
designated individuals was limited to the specified individuals and could not be assigned
or inherited.
Contracts are not assignable when "they involve a matter of personal trust or
confidence or are for personal services." Scott v. Fix Brothers Enterprises, Inc., 667 P.2d
773 (Col. Ct. App. 1983). Utah law has followed this principle, holding that "a contract
which is personal in nature, where the personal needs, characteristics or personality of the
obligee are dominant factors in the reason for contracting, is not assignable." Clark v.
Shelton, 584 P.2d 875, 877 (Utah 1978).
It is apparent from the face of the Complaint that the contract alleged by the
Estate, if it existed, was highly personal in nature, and not assignable. Gary and Dale

duration it is valid for a reasonable time but unless otherwise agreed may be terminated at
any time by either party." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-309.

were brothers. They each were shareholders in the companies and, according to the
Complaint, agreed to operate the companies informally as partners, with neither business
doing anything without the consent of both Gary and Dale. This quite obviously was a
relationship of personal trust and confidence, where the personal traits and characteristics
of each were dominant factors in the relationship. The right to manage the corporations
ought not to transfer to their heirs as a matter of law.
Closely-held corporations sometimes operate more like a partnership, without
compliance with all of the formalities that usually apply to corporations. See Roos v.
Aloi, 487 N.Y.S. 2d 637, 640 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1985) (in the case of closely held
corporations, "certain formalities may be waived" and the court may "treat the
shareholders as copartners"). The purpose of § 732 is to provide a mechanism whereby
shareholders of a closely-held corporation can adapt the enterprise to meet their needs,
without complying with the management structure ordinarily applicable to corporations.
Section 732(6) expressly authorizes a shareholder agreement that "treats a corporation as
if it were a partnership." UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-732(6). Given the nature of
closely-held corporations, Utah partnership law, although not controlling, is persuasive
by analogy with respect to the issue of whether management rights can be assigned and
inherited.
Utah statutory provisions provide that a partner may assign his interest in a
partnership unless an agreement provides otherwise, and the assignment permits the
assignee to receive the partnership profits to which the assigning partner would be
entitled. However, the Act further specifies that the assignment does not "entitle the

assignee during the continuance of the partnership to interfere in the management or
administration of the partnership business or affairs." UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-24. The
Act further provides that an assignment of a partnership interest merely allows the
assignee to receive profits to which the assigning partner otherwise would have been
entitled. Id. Furthermore, Utah partnership law provides that upon the death of a partner,
the heirs of the deceased partner do not step into the shoes of the deceased to continue
operating the business. Rather, the death of a partner results in the dissolution of the
partnership. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-28(4). Utah partnership law adopts the common
sense notion that the personal relationships inherently required in the management of a
business should not be involuntarily imposed upon anyone.
The position urged by the Estate would lead to an absurd, impracticable result. If
the position urged by the Estate is accepted, it would mean that the heirs of Gary and
Dale, as owners of the stock, are forever bound by an agreement that requires a personal
relationship among them in the management of the companies. If the Estate's position is
adopted, this agreement of indefinite duration could never be terminated, and Gary's and
Dale's heirs would forever be involuntarily compelled to act as partners in managing the
companies. Not only does the law not require this result, it is difficult to imagine that
either Gary or Dale contemplated such an arrangement. Indeed, the Complaint fails even
to allege that Gary and Dale contemplated that the shareholder agreement described in
the complaint would extend beyond the death of either.

Stability and competent

management is necessary for the continued success of any company.

The Estate's

position could place these important goals in jeopardy, and will undoubtedly result in
contention and uncertainty in the companies' management structure.
D. T H E TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE ESTATE'S CLAIMS BECAUSE THE
ESTATE CONCEDES THAT ALL CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES ARE BARRED BY UTAH
CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(1) AND THE EQUITABLE REMEDY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
IS NOT AVAILABLE TO COMPEL PARTIES TO ENGAGE IN A PERSONAL
RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST IN MANAGING AND OPERATING A BUSINESS.

In the trial court, the Estate conceded that any claim it may have asserted for
damages is barred by the statute of frauds as set out in UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(1).
This statutory provision provides that an agreement not to be performed within one year
is void unless it is in writing. In the trial court, the Estate conceded the applicability of §
25-5-4(1), stating "the agreements do fall within the purview of Section 25-5-4(1)."
(Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to the Ostler International and Ostler Property
Development Motion to Dismiss, p. 14, ROA p. 157). The Estate has argued, however,
that to the extent its claims seek specific performance of the shareholder agreement, the
claims survive because the agreement was partly performed.
UTAH CODE ANN.

The Estate relied upon

§ 25-5-8 to make this argument, which states:

Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers
of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part
performance thereof.
This argument fails because, as noted above, the legislature did not include a part
performance exception to the mandatory requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a732(2). In addition, this argument fails because courts will not specifically enforce
agreements involving personal relationships.

It should first be noted that the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs claims to
the extent they seek to recover damages. The saving clause found in § 25-5-8 only
preserves claims for specific performance based upon the part performance doctrine. The
Estate makes no argument that any claim for damages somehow survives, and there is no
legal authority to support such a position. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed
all of Plaintiff s claims to the extent the claims seek to recover damages.
In addition, the Estate's claims fail because it is clear from the face of the
Complaint that specific performance is not possible as a remedy in this case. The Estate
seeks a court order that would require that Gary's heirs and Dale Ostler work together as
partners in managing the business of the Corporate Defendamts. The Estate seeks an
order requiring that the Estate's consent is necessary before the Corporate Defendants can
implement any business policy or practice and that the Estate must be permitted to
participate in the management of the business. The order which the Estate seeks extends
far beyond the Estate and Dale Ostler. The Estate apparently would have this Court order
that the heirs or successors to Dale and Gary are perpetually bound by the alleged verbal
agreement that the owners of the stock would operate the businesses as partners, with no
major decisions being made without the consent of all the stockholders. In short, the
Estate seeks an order compelling personal relationships among both present and future
shareholders, as well as an order compelling those shareholders to render personal
services to the companies pursuant to an alleged verbal agreement between Dale and
Gary. Courts, however, cannot properly order parties to work together in such a fashion,
nor should any court enter such any order that undoubtedly would require ongoing

judicial intervention and supervision of these companies' business practices for years to
come.
The restatement provides as follows:
(1) A promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced.
(2) A promise to render personal service exclusively for one employer will
not be enforced by an injunction against serving another if its probable
result will be to compel a performance involving personal relations the
enforced continuance of which is undesirable....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 367 (1979). Following this principle, courts

have declined to order specific performance of partnership agreements, even if there is a
breach of the agreement.
[t]he relationship of partners is one of agency. It is so personal in nature
that equity will not enforce the continuation of a partnership when one
partner elects to terminate it, even though termination would be contrary to
the partnership agreement.
Logan v. Logan, 675 P.2d 1242, 1249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
Courts also decline to enter orders of specific performance when to do so would
impose a difficult burden of ongoing supervision on the court. The restatement provides
as follows:
A promise will not be specifically enforced if the character and magnitude
of the performance would impose on the court burdens in enforcement or
supervision that are disproportionate to the advantages to be gained from
enforcement and to the harm to be suffered from its denial.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 366 (1979). Following this principle, courts

have concluded that "[n]o affirmative equitable relief is better than problematic equitable
relief," and "[e]quitable remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair,

and what is workable." Entergy Arkansas, Inc. v. Entergy Louisiana, Inc., 226 F. Supp.
2d 1047, 1160 (D. Neb. 2002) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973)),
aff d 358 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2004).
If the Court were to grant an order of specific performance along the lines
requested by Plaintiff, the Court would bear the burden of continued supervision and
interpretation concerning the relationship of reluctant, unwilling partners in a partnership
that will have no end. It is simply not fair to coerce the parties into a relationship of such
personal trust. Undoubtedly any order compelling an ongoing partnership will lead to
further disputes and continued resort to court intervention.

This is an inappropriate

burden to place on the trial court and it is not fair to the parties.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal
of the complaint.
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16-10a-728. Voting for directors - Cumulative voting.

(1) At each election of directors, unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or
this chapter, every shareholder entitled to vote at the election has the right to cast, in person or by
proxy, all of the votes to which the shareholder's shares are entitled for as many persons as there
are directors to be elected and for whose election the shareholder has the right to vote.
(2) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or this chapter, directors are
elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to vote in the election, at a meeting
of shareholders at which a quorum is present.
(3) Shareholders do not have a right to cumulate their votes for the election of directors
unless the articles of incorporation so provide.
(4) A statement included in the articles of incorporation to the effect that all or a designated
voting group of shareholders are entitled to cumulate their votes for directors, means that the
shareholders designated are entitled to multiply the number of votes they are entitled to cast by
the number of directors for whom they are entitled to vote and cast the product for a single
candidate or distribute the product among two or more candidates.
(5) Shares entitled to vote cumulatively may be voted cumulatively at each election of
directors unless the articles of incorporation provide alternative procedures for the exercise of the
cumulative voting rights.

History: C. 1953,16-10a-728, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 75.
16-10a-732. Shareholder agreements.

(1) An agreement among the shareholders of a corporation that complies with this section is
effective among the shareholders and the corporation even though it is inconsistent with one or
more other provisions of this chapter in that it:
(a) eliminates the board of directors or restricts the discretion or powers of the board of
directors;
(b) governs the authorization or making of distributions whether or not in proportion to
ownership of shares, subject to the limitations in Section 16-10a-640;
(c) establishes who shall be directors or officers of the corporation, or their terms of office or
© 2005 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the
restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement.

manner of selection or removal;
(d) governs, in general or in regard to specific matters, the exercise or division of voting
power by or between the shareholders and directors or by or among any of them, including use of
weighted voting rights or director proxies;
(e) establishes the terms and conditions of any agreement for the transfer or use of property or
the provision of services between the corporation and any shareholder, director, officer or
employee of the corporation or among any of them;
(f) transfers to one or more shareholders or other persons all or part of the authority to
exercise the corporate powers or to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, including
the resolution of any issue about which there exists a deadlock among directors or shareholders;
(g) requires dissolution of the corporation at the request of one or more of the shareholders or
upon the occurrence of a specified event or contingency; or
(h) otherwise governs the exercise of the corporate powers or the management of the business
and affairs of the corporation or the relationship among the shareholders, the directors and the
corporation, or among any of them, and is not contrary to public policy.
(2) An agreement authorized by this section shall be:
(a) set forth:
(i) in the articles of incorporation or bylaws and approved by all persons who are
shareholders at the time of the agreement; or
(ii) in a written agreement that is signed by all persons who are shareholders at the time of the
agreement and is made known to the corporation;
(b) subject to amendment only by all persons who are shareholders at the time of the
amendment, unless the agreement provides otherwise; and
(c) valid for 10 years, unless the agreement provides otherwise.
(3) The existence of an agreement authorized by this section shall be noted conspicuously on
the front or back of each certificate for outstanding shares or on the information statement
required by Section 16-10a-626(2). If at the time of the agreement the corporation has shares
outstanding represented by certificates, the corporation shall recall the outstanding certificates
and issue substitute certificates that comply with this subsection. The failure to note the existence
of the agreement on the certificate or information statement does not affect the validity of the
agreement or any action taken pursuant to it. Any purchaser of shares who, at the time of
purchase, did not have knowledge of the existence of the agreement is entitled to rescission of the
purchase. A purchaser is considered to have knowledge of the existence of the agreement if its
existence is noted on the certificate or information statement for the shares in compliance with
© 2005 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the LexisNexis Group All rights reserved Use of this product is subject to the
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this subsection and, if the shares are not represented by a certificate, the information statement is
delivered to the purchaser at or prior to the time of purchase of the shares. An action to enforce
the right of rescission authorized by this subsection must be commenced within the earlier of
ninety days after discovery of the existence of the agreement or two years after the time of
purchase of the shares.
(4) An agreement authorized by this section shall cease to be effective when shares of the
corporation are listed on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a market maintained
by one or more members of a national or affiliated securities association. If the agreement ceases
to be effective for any reason, the board of directors may, if the agreement is contained or
referred to in the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws, adopt an amendment to the
articles of incorporation or bylaws, without shareholder action, to delete the agreement and any
references to it.
(5) An agreement authorized by this section that limits the discretion or powers of the board
of directors shall relieve the directors of, and impose upon the person or persons in whom the
discretion or powers are vested, liability for acts or omissions imposed by laws on directors to the
extent that the discretion or powers of the directors are limited by the agreement.
(6) The existence or performance of an agreement authorized by this section may not be a
ground for imposing personal liability on any shareholder for the acts or debts of the corporation
even if the agreement or its performance treats the corporation as if it were a partnership or
results in failure to observe the corporate formalities otherwise applicable to the matters
governed by the agreement.
(7) Incorporators or subscribers for shares may act as shareholders with respect to an
agreement authorized by this section if no shares have been issued when the agreement is made.

History: C. 1953,16-10a-732, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 78.
16-10a-801. Requirement for and duties of board of directors.

(1) Except as provided in Section 16-10a-732, each corporation must have a board of
directors.
(2) All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and
affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any
limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation or in an agreement authorized under Section
16-10a-732.
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History: C. 1953,16-10a-801, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 80.
16-10a-805. Terms of directors generally.

(1) Except as provided in Section 16-10a-806, the terms of the initial directors of a
corporation expire at the first shareholders' meeting at which directors are elected.
(2) Except as provided in Section 16-i0a-806, the terms of all other directors expire at the
next annual shareholders' meeting following their election.
(3) A decrease in the number of directors does not shorten an incumbent director's term.
(4) (a) A director elected to fill a vacancy created other than by an increase in the number of
directors shall be elected for the unexpired term of the director's predecessor in office, or for any
lesser period as may be prescribed by the board of directors.
(b) If a director is elected to fill a vacancy created by reason of an increase in the number of
directors, then the term of the director so elected expires at the next shareholders' meeting at
which directors are elected, unless the vacancy is filled by a vote of the shareholders, in which
case the term shall expire on the later of:
(i) the next meeting of shareholders at which directors are elected; or
(ii) the term designated for the director at the time of the creation of the position being filled.
(5) Despite the expiration of a director's term, the director continues to serve until the
election and qualification of a successor or until there is a decrease in the number of directors.
(6) A director whose term has ended may deliver to the division for filing a statement to that
effect pursuant to Section 16-10a-1608.

History: C. 1953,16-10a-805, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 84.
16-10a-810. Vacancy on board.

(1) Unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise, if a vacancy occurs on a board of
directors, including a vacancy resulting from an increase in the number of directors:
(a) the shareholders may fill the vacancy;
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(b) the board of directors may fill the vacancy; or
(c) if the directors remaining in office constitute fewer than a quorum of the board, they may
fill the vacancy by the affirmative vote of a majority of all the directors remaining in office.
(2) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, if the vacant office was held or
is to be held by a director elected by a voting group of shareholders:
(a) if one or more of the other directors elected by the same voting group are serving, only
they are entitled to vote to fill the vacancy if it is filled by the directors; and
(b) only the holders of shares of that voting group are entitled to vote to fill the vacancy if it
is filled by the shareholders.
(3) A vacancy that will occur at a specific later date, by reason of a resignation effective at a
later date under Section 16-10a-807 or otherwise, may be filled before the vacancy occurs, but
the new director may not take office until the vacancy occurs.

History: C. 1953,16-10a-810, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 89; 1993, ch. 184, § 2.
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and signed.

(1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum
of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the agreement:
(a) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making
of the agreement;
(b) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
(c) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, except
mutual promises to marry;
(d) every special promise made by an executor or administrator to answer in damages for the
liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his own estate;
(e) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real
estate for compensation; and
(f) every credit agreement.
(2) (a) As used in Subsection (l)(f) and this Subsection (2):
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(i) (A) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by a financial institution to:
(I) lend, delay, or otherwise modify an obligation to repay money, goods, or things in action;
(II) otherwise extend credit; or
(III) make any other financial accommodation.
(B) "Credit agreement" does not include the usual and customary agreements related to
deposit accounts or overdrafts or other terms associated with deposit accounts or overdrafts.
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institution which extends credit or extends a financial
accommodation under a credit agreement with a debtor.
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or obtains credit, or seeks or receives a financial
accommodation, under a credit agreement with a financial institution.
(iv) "Financial institution" means:
(A) a state or federally chartered:
(I) bank;
(II) savings and loan association;
(III) savings bank;
(IV) industrial bank; or
(V) credit union; or
(B) any other institution under the jurisdiction of the commissioner of Financial Institutions
as provided in Title 7, Financial Institutions Act.
(b) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(e)5 a debtor or a creditor may not maintain an
action on a credit agreement unless the agreement:
(A) is in writing;
(B) expresses consideration;
(C) sets forth the relevant terms and conditions; and
(D) is signed by the party against whom enforcement of the agi cement would be sought.
(ii) For purposes of this act, a signed application constituies a signed agreement, if the
creditor does not customarily obtain an additional signed agreement from the debtor when
granting the application.
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(c) The following actions do not give rise to a claim that a credit agreement is created, unless
the agreement satisfies the requirements of Subsection (2)(b):
(i) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor;
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or
(iii) the creation for any purpose between a creditor and a debtor of fiduciary or other
business relationships.
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a clearly stated typewritten or printed provision
giving notice to the debtor that the written agreement is a final expression of the agreement
between the creditor and debtor and the written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence
of any alleged oral agreement. The provision does not have to be on the promissory note or other
evidence of indebtedness that is tied to the credit agreement.
(e) A credit agreement is binding and enforceable without any signature by the party to be
charged if:
(i) the debtor is provided with a written copy of the terms of the agreement;
(ii) the agreement provides that any use of the credit offered shall constitute acceptance of
those terms; and
(iii) after the debtor receives the agreement, the debtor, or a person authorized by the debtor,
requests funds pursuant to the credit agreement or otherwise uses the credit offered.

History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2467; L. 1909, ch. 72, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 5817; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 33-5-4; L. 1989, ch. 257, § 1; 1996, ch. 182, § 24; 2004, ch. 92, § 24.
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected.

Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to
compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof.

History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2477; C.L. 1917, § 5824; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,33-5-8.
48-1-24. Assignment of partner's interest.
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A conveyance by a partner of his interest in the partnership does not of itself dissolve the
partnership, or, as against the other partners in the absence of agreement, entitle the assignee
during the continuance of the partnership to interfere in the management or administration of the
partnership business or affairs, or to require any information or account of partnership
transactions, or to inspect the partnership books; but it merely entitles the assignee to receive in
accordance with his contract the profits to which the assigning partner would otherwise be
entitled.
In case of a dissolution of a partnership, the assignee is entitled to receive his assignor's
interest, and may require an account from the date only of the last account agreed to by all the
partners.

History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 27; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 69-1-24.
48-1-28. Causes of dissolution.

Dissolution is caused:
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners:
(a) By the termination of the definite term or particular undertaking specified in the
agreement.
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite term or particular undertaking is
specified.
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not assigned their interests, or suffered
them to be charged for their separate debts, either before or after the termination of any specified
term or particular undertaking.
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in accordance with such a
power conferred by the agreement between the partners.
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the circumstances do not
permit a dissolution under any other provision of this section, by the express will of any partner
at any time.
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the partnership to be carried on
or for the members to carry it on in partnership.
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(4) By the death of any partner.
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership.
(6) By decree of court under Section 48-1-29.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 31; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 69-1-28.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT c
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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rDOUGLAS L. STOWELL, et al.

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 040926555

vs
June 8, 2005
OSTLER INTERNATIONAL, et al
Defendant.

The above matter came before the Court on June 6, 2005 for
oral argument on Defendants' motions to dismiss, Plaintiff's Motion
to Postpone Decision, and the Ostler Defendants' Motion to Strike,
pursuant to Rule 7. Plaintiff was present through Gary A. Weston,
the Ostlers were present

through Mark A. Larsen, and Ostler

International and Ostler Property Development ("the corporations")
were present through Steven G. Loosle.
The

corporations'

Motion

to

Dismiss, with

memorandum, was filed on January 20, 2005.

accompanying

On January 24, 2005,

the Ostlers filed their Motion to Dismiss with an accompanying
memorandum and an affidavit. Plaintiff filed his opposition to the
corporations' motion on February 15, 2005, and independently filed
his opposition to the Ostlers' motion on February 22, 2005. On the
same date, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Postpone Decision on the
Ostler Motion to Dismiss, with accompanying affidavit. The Ostlers

filed their reply in support of their motion to dismiss on February
28,

2005.

On March

3, 2005, the Ostlers

filed both their

opposition to Plaintiff's motion to postpone and their motion to
strike, with accompanying memorandum, and the corporations' reply
in support of their motion was also filed on March 3, 2005.
Plaintiff's reply in support of his motion to postpone was filed on
March 10, 2005 and his opposition to the Ostlers' motion to strike
followed on March 17, 2005.

The Ostlers filed their reply in

support of their motion to strike on March 24, 2005. These motions
were submitted for decision on March 29, 2005.
The court scheduled and heard oral argument and took the matter
under advisement. Having considered the case file, the motion and
the memoranda submitted by the parties, and the arguments made in
open court, the Court enters the following decision.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Douglas Stowell is the Personal Representative of
the Estate of Gary W. Ostler, who, at the time of his death in July
2003, was 50% shareholder in Defendants Ostler International Inc.,
and Ostler Property Development, Inc., both of which are closely
held corporations.

At the time Gary Ostler died his brother

Defendant Dale Ostler held the other 50% of the shares in both
corporations.

Both brothers, without the benefit of bylaws or any

provisions in the articles of incorporation, and apparently by oral
-2-

agreement,

served

as the board

of directors

and

shared equal

decision-making authority for both companies. Shortly after Gary's
death, Dale Ostler appointed himself and another brother, Defendant
Vyron Ostler, as the new Board of Directors in both companies.
Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of the Estate of Gary
Ostler to seek to require the parties to continue to operate under
the oral agreement under which the parties operated prior to Gary's
death, and specifically

to require and enjoin

Defendants

from

taking any action without the consent of Plaintiff, including, but
not limited to, appointing a new board of directors.

DISCUSSION
Treatment of Ostlers' Motion as Motion for Summary Judgment
The crux of the arguments in favor of dismissal of this action
lies in the simple proposition that because the alleged agreement
between Gary and Dale Ostler was not in writing, it cannot be
enforced.

The affidavit of Dale Ostler, while it may be useful for

determining what the terms of such agreement were, is not helpful
in

determining

the

legal

question

of

whether

any

such

oral

agreement can be enforced under either the Utah Revised Business
Corporations Act, or under

its predecessor, the Utah Business

Corporations Act.
In the court's view, this is a purely legal consideration, and
-3-

the facts upon which such a legal determination may be made are
contained

entirely

in

the

Complaint

filed

in

this

matter.

Accordingly, because the court does not rely upon the Affidavit of
Dale Ostler in reaching its decision, the court hereby excludes
such, and determines this matter under Rule

12(b)(6) as the

substantive motions filed herein invite.
Consequently, Plaintiff's motion to postpone and the Ostlers'
motion to strike, inasmuch as these motions were relevant only if
the Ostler Motion was considered as a motion filed under Rule 56,
are hereby DENIED as moot.

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
Because the court considers the present motions as they were
presented, and excludes all matters outside the pleading, it is
appropriate that the court consider the facts as alleged to be
true, indulging all reasonable inferences consistent with the
allegations of the complaint.
Enforceability of the Oral Agreement
Plaintiff's nine causes of action seek enforcement of the oral
agreement under contract and equitable theories, and those theories
include breach of contract (first and second causes of action),
constructive trust (third), unjust enrichment (fourth), breach of
fiduciary duty (fifth), promissory estoppel (sixth). The complaint
-4-

also seek declaratory

and injunctive relief and an accounting

(seventh-ninth causes of action) .

At the heart of all of these

causes of action are duties which arose as a result of an oral
agreement between Dale Ostler and Gary Ostler.

While the court

assumes the existence of an agreement between the two brothers, the
question arises whether the agreement is still in force, which may
be determined upon facts as alleged in the complaint.
Applicability of U.C.A. § 16-10A-732
For purposes of this motion, the court accepts Plaintiff's
argument that while there were two separate corporations formed,
the agreement under which both corporations were managed predates
those incorporations, and also predates the Utah Revised Business
Corporations Act.

However, the act specifically applies itself to

those corporations which were in existence at the time it was
enacted, as well as those formed afterward, in an attempt to ensure
the uniform application of the law to all corporations then in
existence.

See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10A-1701.

Plaintiff has not

submitted to the court any basis for application of the saving
provisions established under § 1704, which provides a limited basis
for the enforcement of the previous act, except for the existence
of

the

agreement

prior

to

enactment

of

the

revised

act.

Accordingly, the court applies the provisions of the Utah Revised
Business Corporations Act to the agreement.
-5-

Restriction on Operational Agreements Outside of the Act
Section 732(2) of the act provides:
(2) An agreement authorized by this section
[i.e. one which takes operation of the company
outside the act] shall be:
(a) set forth:
(I)
in
the
articles
of
incorporation or bylaws and approved
by all persons who are shareholders
at the time of the agreement; or
(ii) in a written agreement
that is signed by all persons who
are shareholders at the time of the
agreement and is made known to the
corporation; . . .
©) valid for 10 years, unless the
agreement provides otherwise.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10A-732(2).

The words "shall be" constitute

mandatory language—in other words, operation within this provision
is limited to only those circumstances specified in the provision.
Those circumstances are that an agreement formed which allows a
corporation to operate outside of the requirements of the Act,
"shall be set forth" in the articles of incorporation or bylaws, or
in a written agreement. Under both methods, the agreement must be
approved by all shareholders.
Furthermore,

Plaintiff's

argument

to

the

contrary

notwithstanding, unless the agreement provides specifically for the
agreement to endure beyond ten years, it falls within the default
operation of subsection 2©) , which is that it "shall be . . . valid
for 10 years."

Because the corporations were formed in 1988 and
-6-

1993, any agreement ceased to be enforceable no later than July
2003, which, coincidentally, was about the time of Gary's death.
If the passage of the Act is considered as the relevant time, the
agreement ceased to be effective in 1992.

Accordingly, the

agreement, even if it had been in writing and thus enforceable,
would no longer have been in force after Gary's death unless it had
provided for a period in excess of ten years. Thus, no action may
be maintained on the contract and the Plaintiff's first and second
causes of action must be dismissed.
Plaintiff argues that section 732 does not label as "invalid"
an agreement that is not in writing. The court disagrees as to the
legal effect of the words "shall" be in writing.

The court

believes that if not in writing, an agreement meant to allow a
diversion from the requirements of the Act must be in writing or it
is not enforceable.
Equitable Treatment of the Agreement
Notwithstanding the failure of the agreement to survive until
the present action accrued, the question remains whether the
promises made to Gary Ostler might create an equitable obligation
upon Dale Ostler and the corporations which inured to the benefit
of Gary's estate.

The difficulty with this is that there is no

allegation in the complaint from which the court may conclude that
the operation of the agreement was intended to benefit any other
-7-

persons than Gary and Dale Ostler.

Throughout the complaint are

statements regarding the intent of Gary and Dale Ostler on how the
profits were to be divided and how decisions were to be made and
how stock ownership was to be divided, but these only serve to
underscore the assumption that those arrangements were made for the
benefit of Gary and Dale personally.

From the informality of the

agreement it may clearly be assumed that these two individuals
believed that they did not need to have any formal agreement or
document detailing how to run the companies precisely because of
the personalities involved.
Gary, and vice versa.

Dale apparently knew he could trust

When Gary died, the value of such an

informal arrangement to Dale perished with Gary.

In light of these

circumstances, it would not be equitable to tie the remaining
member of the corporations to Gary's estate, and force him to
conduct business as if nothing had happened, especially when there
is absolutely

no allegation

that the parties

established

this

business for anything more than their own personal benefit.

The

court accordingly concludes that this was a personal agreement
between Gary and Dale Ostler.

The obligations of Dale Ostler to

continue conducting business as had been agreed in years previous
was an obligation to Gary alone and ended when Gary died, just as
surely as Gary's obligations to Dale cannot be enforced beyond the
grave.
-8-

CONCLUSION
Because the agreements between Dale and Gary Ostler were not
enforceable as a matter of contract law under the Utah Revised
Business Corporation Act, and because they were personal agreements
not enforceable under principles of equity, Defendants Motions to
Dismiss are hereby GRANTED.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the Court, and no other
order is required.
DATED this

V

~7?~

day of June, 2005,
/

Judge Bruce Lubeck
District Court Judge
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Telephone: (801)327-8200
Facsimile: (801)327-8222
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS L. STOWELL, PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF GARY W. OSTLER, deceased,
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT
vs.

OSTLER INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
Llah coiporation; OSTLER PROPERTY
DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah
corporation; DALE OSTLER and VYRON
OSTLER,

Civil No.
Judge

'JM'/3L4S5S

Xu U c, iL~

(Jury Demanded)

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Douglas L. Stowell, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary W. Ostler,
deceased, hereby demands trial by jury and complains as follows and against the Defendants
Ostler International, Inc., Ostler Property Development, Inc., Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler.

PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff, Douglas L. Stowell, is Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary

Ostler, deceased, having been so appointed by this Court on September 17, 2003, m Probate Case
No. 033901263 The decedent, Gary Ostler, ("Decedent") died on July 13, 2003.
2.

Decedent, and Defendants Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler are brothers.

3

Defendant, Ostler International, Inc. ("Ostler International"), is a Utah corporation

with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
4.

Defendant, Ostler Property Development, Inc. ("Ostler Property Development"),

is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
5.

Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler are Directois of Ostler International and of Ostler

Property Development and are officers of Ostler Property Development Vyron Ostler is an
officer of Ostler International
6.

This Court has jurisdiction over the claims set forth herein pursuant to § 78-3-

4(1), Utah Code Annotated
7

The herein causes of action arise in Salt Lake County, Utah and one or more of

the Defendants resides or maintains a principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah;
wherefore, venue properly lies in this County pursuant to § 78-13-7, Utah Code Annotated.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
8.

Decedent and Dale Ostler incorporated Ostler International about January 13, 1988

with each issued and holding 50% of all shares of capital stock of the company. Each intended

4843-1480-2688 ST6341 001
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and represented to the other of them that each would own and control one-half of the equity
interest of the company.
9.

Decedent and Dale Ostler incorporated Ostler Property Development about July

14, 1993, with each issued and holding 50% of all shares of capital stock of the company Each
intended and represented to the other of them that each would own and control one-half of the
equity interest of the company.
10.

Until Decedent's death, all shares of capital stock of Ostler International and of

Ostler Property Development issued and outstanding were held 50% by Decedent and 50% by
Dale Ostler.
11.

Since Decedent's death, all issued and outstanding shares of capital stock of Ostler

International and of Ostler Property Development have been held 50% by Dale Ostler and 50% by
Decedent's estate.
12.

At all times prior to Decedent's death, Decedent and Dale Ostler were and served

as the Directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development
13.

On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that on one or more brief occasions,

prior to Decedent's death, and at the request of Decedent and of Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler was a
nominal and non-participating member of the Board of Directors of Ostler International.
14.

On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that on one or more brief occasions,

prior to Decedent's death, and at the request of Decedent and of Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler was a
nominal and non-participating member of the Board of Directors of Ostler Property Development.
15.

Prior to Decedent's death, Ostler International had historically distnbuted more

than 80% of its net profits to Decedent and Dale Ostler as shareholders of the company. The
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distributions were made regularly and approximately quarterly, 50% to Decedent and 50% to Dale
Ostler.
16.

Pursuant to the annual report filed by Ostler International with the Utah

Department of Commerce on or about March 26, 1998, it was represented that Vyron Ostler had
been removed as a Director of the company and that the company's Board of Directors consisted
of two members. Further, the Annual Report which the company filed with Utah Department of
Commerce on November 7, 2003 declared the directors of the company, to be Dale Ostler and
Vyron Ostler.
17.

Some time after Decedent's death, Dale Ostler appointed Vyron Ostler to be a

member of the Board of Directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development. It
was Dale Ostler's intention that he and Vyron Ostler constitute the Board of Directors of each
company.
18.

Vyron Ostler was not a shareholder of either Ostler International or of Ostler

Property Development at any time prior to the death of the Decedent.
19.

On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that no bylaws for Ostler International

have been enacted or adopted.
20.

On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that no bylaws for Ostler Property

Development have been enacted or adopted.
21.

All policy and practices for the operation of Ostler [nternational and for the

operation of Ostler Property Development, including the conduct of the business of each company
and the making of net income distributions to shareholders of each company was formulated and
implemented only and solely by Decedent and Dale Ostler as the only shareholders of each
-4-

company and with the consent of the other of them. No company policies, programs, business
ventures or net income distributions were undertaken without their joint and mutual consent. All
decisions and policies of both Ostler International and Ostler Property Development and of the
Board of Directors of each company were contingent, conditional and based upon the mutual
consent and approval of said shareholders. It was the understanding, agreement and practice of
each company's board of directors and each member thereof that the business and affairs of the
company should and would be undertaken and managed only in accordance with such mutual
consent of the company's shareholders.
22.

It was the intention, design and purpose of Decedent and of Dale Ostler that shares

of the capital stock of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development neither should nor
would, except upon their mutual consent and agreement as shareholders, be offered or provided to
any other person.
23.

Pursuant to §§ 75-3-703, 75-3-708, 75-3-710 and 75-3-714, Utah Code Annotated

Douglas L. Stowell as Personal Representative of the Decedent's Estate is charged to and does
hold all rights and interests held by Decedent at the time of Decedent's death, including all right,
title and interest of the Decedent in and to the shares of capital stock of both Ostler International
and of Ostler Property Development owned and held by Decedent. Plaintiff holds such
ownership, title and interest, in trust, as successor in interest to Decedent and for and in behalf of
the creditors and beneficiaries of Decedent's estate.
24.

Plaintiff has made demand or does hereby demand that Defendants recognize

Plaintiff as entitled to and holding the same right and interest held by Decedent as formulated and
implemented by Decedent and Dale Ostler pursuant to their past custom, usage and course of
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dealing and as was recognized by the directors and officers of Ostler International and of Ostler
Property Development. Plaintiff has demanded or does hereby demand that the business of Ostler
International and of Ostler Property Development be conducted only m accordance with the past
custom, usage and course of dealing between Decedent and Dale Ostler and that no new policy of
either company be adopted or pursued or business conducted without the mutual consent of
Plaintiff and Dale Ostler.
25.

Defendants have not recognized and performed in accordance with the custom,

usage and course of dealing formulated and implemented between Decedent and Dale Ostler.
They have failed and refused to permit Plaintiffs involvement in the determination and
implementation of policy and the conduct of the business of Ostler International and of Ostler
Property Development and have failed and refused to require that such policy be formulated and
implemented only with the mutual consent of Plaintiff and Dale Ostler. In particular the
Defendants'
(a)

Have adopted and implemented policies to which Plaintiff is not in
agreement.

(b)

Have failed to call and conduct a meeting of the Shareholders to afford
Plaintiff his right to vote the shares of capital stock of Ostler International
and of Ostler Property Development and which he holds as a shareholder of
each company.

(c)

Have nominated, appointed or elected one or more members of the Board
of Directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development
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without prior notice to, consulting with and obtaining the agreement of
Plaintiff.
(d)

Intend to issue additional shares of capital stock of Ostler International and
of Ostler Property Development to one or more of the Defendants and to
third parties allegedly and purportedly in compensation for services
rendered or to be rendered by such persons to Ostler International and to
Ostler Property Development. The issuance of such shares will compromise
and impair the value of the shares held by Plaintiff and the value of
Plaintiffs interest in each company.

(e)

Intend to retain in Ostler International and in Ostler Property Development
the preponderant part of all net earnings of the company and to disburse
only a nominal portion of the amount to which Plaintiff is entitled.

(f)

Have failed and refused to make regular distributions of net income of
Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development as historically
made and as agreed between Decedent and Dale Ostler and in particular,
have refused to make such distributions to which Plaintiff is entitled.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Breach of Contract - Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler International)
26.

Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25

27.

Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that it was the agreement of

above.

Decedent and Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler International and the custom, usage and course
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of dealing of they and any other director and the officers of Ostler International, that all policy of
the company would be adopted and implemented and the company managed, operated and its
business conducted only upon and pursuant to the mutual consent and agreement of the
company's shareholders Both Decedent and Dale Ostler agreed that in consideration for such
agreement of the other and such course of dealing, that they would continue to maintain, operate
and conduct the business of Ostler International only for their mutual financial benefit and that
neither would commission, engage in or conduct any business policy or activity to which the other
did not agree Prior to the death of Decedent, the business of the company was managed, operated
and conducted m accordance with and pursuant to said agreement, custom and usage and
Decedent, Dale Ostlei, Vyron Ostler and Ostler International performed m accordance therewith
28

Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Decedent and Dale Ostlei

further agreed that except upon their mutual consent and agreement as shareholders of Ostler
International, that shares of the capital stock of the company would neither be offered nor
provided to any other person
29.

Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler International have breached their agreement

with Decedent and with Plaintiff in the particulars as set forth and pled in paragraphs 25(a) to and
including 25(f)
30.

These Defendants have further breached their agreement and their duty and

obligation thereunder, to not adopt or implement or cause or permit Ostler International to adopt
or implement any policy or business practice without the approval and consent of Plaintiff as
successor in interest to Decedent's right and interest under the Agreement
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31

As a consequence of the failure and refusal of these Defendants to recognize and

continue to perform m accordance with their agreement, custom, usage and course of dealing with
Decedent and their refusal to permit Plaintiffs involvement m the determination and
implementation of policy and the conduct of the business of Ostler International, Plaintiff does not
have an adequate remedy at law against these Defendants and, is entitled to an order of the Court
requiring these Defendants to specifically perform in accordance with their agreement, custom,
usage and couise of dealing with the Decedent and in particular
(a)

To adopt and implement policies and business practices of Ostler
International only with the mutual consent of Plaintiff or his successor and
Dale Ostler

(b)

To forthwith call and conduct a meeting of the shareholders, with proper
and timely notice to Plaintiff, and to there afford and permit Plaintiff his
right to vote the shares of capital stock of Ostler International which he
holds as a shareholder of the company

(c)

To elect or appoint members of Ostler International's Board of Directors
only upon propel and timely notice to Plaintiff or his successor, and the
mutual consent of Plaintiff or his successoi and Dale Ostler

(d)

To not issue additional shares of capital stock of Ostler International
without the mutual consent of Plaintiff or his successor and Dale Ostler

(e)

To disburse all net earnings of Ostler International in accordance with the
custom, course of dealing and agreement between Decedent and Dale
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Ostler unless otherwise mutually agreed between Plaintiff or his successor
and Dale Ostler.
In the event that the failure of these Defendants to perform in accordance with their agreement,
custom and course of dealing with Decedent causes damage to Plaintiff then in that event,
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against such Defendants for damages in an amount to be
determined by the Court.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Contract - Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler Property Development)
32.

Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25

33.

Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that it was the agreement of

above.

Decedent and Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler Property Development and the custom, usage
and course of dealing of they and any other director and the officers of Ostler Property
Development, that all policy of the company would be adopted and implemented and the
company managed, operated and its business conducted only upon and pursuant to the mutual
consent and agreement of the company's shareholders. Both Decedent and Dale Ostler agreed
that in consideration for such agreement of the other and such course of dealing, that they would
continue to maintain, operate and conduct the business of Ostler Property Development only for
their mutual financial benefit and that neither would commission, engage in or conduct any
business policy or activity to which the other did not agree. Prior to the death of Decedent, the
business of the company was managed, operated and conducted in accordance with and pursuant
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to said agreement, custom and usage and Decedent, Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler
Property Development performed in accordance therewith.
34.

Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Decedent and Dale Ostler

further agreed that except upon their mutual consent and agreement as a shareholder of Ostler
Property Development, that shares of the capital stock of the company would neither be offered
nor provided to any other person.
35.

Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler Property Development have breached their

agreement with Decedent and with Plaintiff in the particulars as set forth and pled in paragraphs
25(a) to and including 25(f).
36.

Those Defendants have further breached their agreement and their duty and

obligation thereunder, to not adopt or implement or cause or permit Ostler Property Development
to adopt or implement any policy or business practice without the approval and consent of
Plaintiff as successor in interest to Decedent's right and interest under the Agreement.
37.

As a consequence of the failure and refusal of these Defendants to recognize and

continue to perform in accordance with their agreement, custom, usage and course of dealing
with Decedent and their refusal to permit Plaintiffs involvement in the determination and
implementation of policy and the conduct of the business of Ostler Property Development,
Plaintiff does not have an adequate remedy at law against these Defendants and, is entitled to an
order of the Court requiring these Defendants to specifically perform in accordance with their
agreement, custom, usage and course of dealing with the Decedent and in particular:
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(a)

To adopt and implement policies and business practices of Ostler Property
Development only with the mutual consent of Plaintiff or his successor
and Dale Ostler

(b)

To forthwith call and conduct a meeting of the shareholders, with proper
and timely notice to Plaintiff, and to theie afford and permit Plaintiff his
nght to vote the shares of capital stock of Ostler Property Development
which he holds as a shareholder of the company

(c)

To elect or appoint members of Ostler Property Development's Board of
Directors only upon proper and timely notu e to Plaintiff or his successor,
and the mutual consent of Plaintiff or his successors and Dale Ostler

(d)

To not issue additional shares of capital stock of Ostler Property
Development without the mutual consent of Plaintiff or his successor and
Dale Ostler

(e)

To disburse all net earnings of Ostler Pioperty Development in accordance
with the custom, course of dealing and agreement between Decedent and
Dale Ostler unless otherwise mutually agreed between Plaintiff or his
successor and Dale Ostler

In the event that the failure of these Defendants to perform m accordance with their agreement,
custom and course of dealing with Decedent causes damage to Plaintiff then m that event,
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against such Defendants for damages m an amount to be
determined by the Court
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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Constructive Trust - Ostler International and Ostler Property Development
Shares - Dale Ostler, Ostler International and Ostler Property Development)
38

Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25

39

The acquisition, holding and ownership of 50% of the shares of capital stock of

above

Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development by Decedent and 50% by Dale Ostler
was foi the purpose of assuring that neithei shaieholdei could, without the other of them,
formulate and implement policy and business practices of Ostler of International and of Ostler
Property Development Their purpose was to assure that each would require the consent of the
other to the operation and management of both of the companies
40

It was not possible for any policy governing the conduct of the business of Ostler

International or of Ostler Property Development to have been validly and legally formulated and
implemented without the mutual consent and agreement of both shareholders
41

Since Decedent's death, the policy and business of Ostler International and of

Ostler Property Development has been undertaken and pursued by each company and by Dale
Ostler all without notice to or the involvement, participation and consent of Plaintiff and all
contiary to the purposes, agieement and course of dealing of Decedent and Dale Ostler as the
shaieholders of each company
42

On principals of equity, Plaintiff is entitled to an order of the Court directed at

Dale Ostler, Ostler International and Ostler Property Development declanng the imposition of a
constructive trust on all of the shares of capital stock of Ostler International and of Ostler
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Property Development, with said shares to be held for the joint and mutual benefit of Dale Ostler
and Plaintiff and his successor.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Quasi - Contract - Unjust Enrichment - Dale Ostler)
43.

Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25

and paragraphs 39 through 41 above.
44.

Decedent and Dale Ostler each thereby conferred a benefit on the other and each

had knowledge of said benefit and voluntarily accepted such benefit from the other.
45.

Dale Ostler now refuses to permit the policy and business of Ostler International

and of Ostler Property Development to be developed and implemented by he and Plaintiff as
shareholders of the companies and refuses to cause or permit each said company and its board of
directors to condition the formulation and implementation of policy upon the mutual consent and
agreement of said shareholders and consequently by his inaction or improper action causes and
permits each of the companies to pursue policies and practices to Ihe financial advantage and
benefit of Dale Ostler and the disadvantage of Plaintiff causing Dale Ostler to be unjustly
enriched thereby.
46.

As a consequence of the unjust enrichment of Dale Ostler, Plaintiff has sustained

damages in an amount to be determined by the Court and for which Plaintiff is entitled to
judgment against Dale Ostler.
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FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty - Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler)
47

Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 thorough

28, 33 and 34, above
48

Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler as directors and officers of Ostler International and

of Ostler Property Development owe a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, as a shareholder of each
company, to neither adopt or implement any policy or conduct any business of such company
contrary to Plaintiffs interest as a shareholder m the company and his rights as agreed and
extended pursuant to Decedent's agreement express oi implied with Dale Ostler and their
custom, usage and couise of dealing and that of the directors and officers of each company
49

Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler have bleached their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff by

engaging m the conduct as more particularly set forth m paragraph 25, above
50

As a consequence of the breach by said Defendants of their fiduciary duty owing

to Plaintiff, Plaintiff as successor m interest to Decedent, has sustained damages in an amount to
be determined by the Court and for which Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Dale Ostler
and Vyron Ostler, jointly and severally
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Promissory Estoppel - Dale Ostler)
51

Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25

52

Decedent and Dale Ostler as shareholders of Ostler International and of Ostler

above

Property Development piomised each other that policies for the operation and conduct of the
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business of each company would be adopted and implemented only with and based upon their
mutual consent.
53.

Decedent acted in reasonable reliance on the promises made by Dale Ostler who

should and did reasonably expect Decedent to so rely and as a consequence thereof, Decedent did
similarly promise to Dale Ostler and in so doing, did not adopt or implement any policy of Ostler
International or of Ostler Property Development without the consent of Dale Ostler.
54.

Dale Ostler was aware of the mutual promises so made by he and Decedent and of

all facts material thereto and knew that Decedent relied on Dale Ostler's promises so made.
55.

As a consequence of the failure and refusal of Dale Ostler to recognize and

continue to perform in accordance with his promises made to Decedent and his refusal to permit
Plaintiffs involvement in the determination and implementation of policy and the conduct of the
business of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development, Plaintiff does not have an
adequate remedy at law against Dale Ostler and, is entitled to an order of the Court requiring
Dale Ostler to specifically perform in accordance with his promises made to Decedent and in
particular:
(a)

To adopt and implement policies and business practices of Ostler
International and Ostler Property Development only with the mutual
consent of Plaintiff or his successor and Dale Ostler.

(b)

To forthwith call and conduct a meeting of the shareholders, with proper
and timely notice to Plaintiff, and to there afford and permit Plaintiff his
right to vote the shares of capital stock of Ostler International and of Ostler
Property Development which he holds as a shareholder of each company.
-16-

(c)

To elect or appoint members of the Board of Directors of Ostler
International and of Ostler Property Development only upon proper and
timely notice to Plaintiff or his successoi, and the mutual consent of
Plaintiff or his successoi and Dale Ostler

(d)

To not issue additional shares of capital stock of Ostler International and
of Ostler Property Development without the mutual consent of Plaintiff or
his successor and Dale Ostler

(e)

To disburse all net earnings of Ostler International and of Ostler Property
Development m accordance with the custom, course of dealing and
agieement between Decedent and Dale Ostler unless otherwise mutually
agreed between Plaintiff or his successoi and Dale Ostlei

In the event that the failure of Dale Ostler to perform m accordance with his promises made to
Decedent causes damage to Plaintiff then in that event, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against
Dale Ostler for damages m an amount to be determined by the Court
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Accounting - All Defendants)
56

Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25

57

Plaintiff is entitled to an order of the Court requiring that Defendants provide to

above

Plaintiff during the pendency of this action, (1) all of the records, information and reports of
Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development as contemplated and provided by ^ 1610a-1601 and 16-10a-1602, Utah Code Ann and not limited to excerpts from or summaries of
-17-

said records and reports In addition, Plaintiff is entitled to an order requiring that Defendants
provide to Plaintiff dunng the pendency of this action, (2) an audited financial statement for each
company for each calendar year prepared in accordance with geneially accepted accounting
principals, (3) unaudited financial statements for each company for each calendar month dunng
the pendency of this action and showing in leasonable detail the assets and liabilities of the
company and the results of the company's business operations, (4) the number of shares of
capital stock of each company which on December 31, 2003 weie proposed or committed to be
issued to any person and the name of such person and (5) the number of shares of capital stock of
each company which on December 1, 2004 were proposed or committed to be issued to any
person and the name of each such person
EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment - All Defendants)
58.

Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained m paragraphs 1 through 25

59.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment pursuant to ^§ 78-33-1 through 78-33-13, Utah

above

Code Annotated, declaring that Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler, Ostler International, Ostler Property
Development and all officers and directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property
Development are obligated to Plaintiff and Plaintiffs successors and assigns, as shareholders of
the companies, and as follows
(a)

To permit Plaintiff and Plaintiffs successors and assigns to be involved m
the formulation and implementation of policies for the conducting of the
business of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development and to
-18-

neither adopt or implement policies or conduct business of the companies
to which Plaintiff or his successors and assigns are not in agreement.
(b)

To cause there to be called at least annually a meeting of shareholders of
Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development and there permit
Plaintiff or his successors and assigns the right and opportunity to vote
their shares of capital stock of Ostler International and of Ostler Property
Development.

(c)

To neither nominate, appoint or elect members of the Board of Directors
of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development without notice
to, consulting with and obtaining the agreement of the Plaintiff or
Plaintiffs successors and assigns.

(d)

To neither cause nor permit any current and existing members of the
Board of Directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property
Development from serving or continuing to serve as Directors without the
mutual consent of Dale Ostler and Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successor or
assigns.

(e)

To cause both Ostler International and Ostler Property Development to
reacquire any shares of capital stock of such company issued without the
consent of Decedent or Plaintiff and that such shares be reacquired by the
issuing company with no cost, expense or loss to Plaintiff or any
dimimshment in the value of the shares of capital stock held by Plaintiff.
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(f)

To not issue or cause to be issued any shares of the capital stock of Ostler
International or of Ostler Property Development without the consent of
Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successors or assigns.

(g)

To cause all or such fractional portion of the net income of Ostler
International and of Ostler Property Development as historically disbursed
to Decedent and to Dale Ostler, to be disbursed and paid over to
shareholders regularly and approximately quarterly, unless consent and
authorization is otherwise first obtained from Dale Ostler and from
Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successors and assigns,
NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Injunction - all Defendants)

60.

Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25

61.

Plaintiff is entitled to a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction

above.

during the pendency of this action enjoining Defendants from:
(a)

Preventing or discouraging Plaintiff and Plaintiffs successors and assigns
from being engaged in the formulation and implementation of policies for
the conducting of the business of Ostler International and of Ostler
Property Development and from adopting or implementing policies to
which Plaintiff or his successors and assigns are not in agreement.

(b)

Failing to cause there to be called at least annually a meeting of
shareholders of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development
-20-

and there permitting Plaintiff or his successors and assigns the right and
opportunity to vote then shares of capital stock of Ostlei International and
of Ostler Property Development
(c)

Nominating, appointing or electing members of the Board of Directors of
Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development without notice to,
consulting with and obtaining the agreement of the Plaintiff or Plaintiffs
successors and assigns

(d)

Causing or permitting any current and existing members of the Boaid of
Directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development to
serve or continuing to serve as Directors without the mutual consent of
Dale Ostlei and Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successor 01 assigns

(e)

Issuing or causing to be issued any shares of the capital stock of Ostler
International and of Ostler Property Development without the consent of
Plaintiff or Plaintiff s successors or assigns

(f)

Permitting or accepting the voting of any shares of the capital stock of
Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development issued without
the consent of Decedent or of Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successors or assigns

(g)

Failing to disburse and pay over to Shareholders of Ostler International
and Ostler Property Development regularly and approximately quarterly all
or such fractional portion of the net income of each company as
historically disbursed to Decedent and to Dale Ostler, unless consent and
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authorization is otherwise first obtained from Dale Ostler and from
Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successors and assigns
62

Plaintiff is entitled, at the conclusion of this action, to a permanent injunction

enjoining the Defendants, their successors and any assigns all as provided in paragraph 61, and
further, from causing or permitting, without the written mutual approval and consent of Dale
Ostler and Plaintiff or Plaintiffs successors and assigns, the adoption or implementation of any
policy of Ostlei International or of Ostler Property Development or the causing of either
company to engage in or conduct its business
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff pi ays for judgment against the Defendants as follows
1

On his FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for a decree of specific performance against

Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler International requinng the pei formance by said Defendants,
then successors and assigns all as provided in paragraph 31 and foi judgment against said
Defendants for damages m an amount to be determined by the Court and such other relief as the
Court may deem proper in the premises
2

On his SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for a decree of specific performance

against Dale Ostler, Vyron Ostler and Ostler Property Development requiring the performance by
said Defendants, their successors and assigns all as provided m paragraph 37 and for judgment
against said Defendants for damages in an amount to be determined by the Court and such othei
relief as the Court may deem proper m the premises
3

On his THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for an order of the Court directed at Dale

Ostler, Ostler International and Ostler Property Development imposing and creating a
constructive trust on all of the shares of capital stock of Ostler International and of Ostler
-22-

Pioperty Development with said shaies to be held for the joint and mutual benefit of Dale Ostler
and Plaintiff and his successoi Plaintiff further prays for such other relief as the Court may
deem piopei m the premises
4

On his FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for judgment against Dale Ostlei for

damages m an amount to be determined by the Court and such other relief as the Court may deem
pioper m the premises
5

On his FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for judgment against Dale Ostler and

Vyion Ostler, jointly and severally, for damages m an amount to be determined by the Court and
such other relief as the Court may deem proper m the premises
6

On his SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for a decree of specific performance against

Dale Ostler lequirmg the peiformance by said Defendant, his successors and assigns all as
piovided in paiagraph 55 and for judgment against said Defendant for damages in an amount to
be determined by the Court and such other relief as the Court may deem proper m the premises
7

On his SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF, foi an order declaring and lequmng

that Defendants and each of them, provide an accounting and information in accordance with and
pursuant to the requirements as set forth m paragraph 57 of the Complaint
8

On his EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for a judgment declaring that Dale Ostler,

Vyron Ostler, Ostler International, Ostler Property Development and the other officers and
directors of Ostler International and of Ostler Property Development are obligated, as a matter of
law, to Plaintiff and Plaintiffs successors and assigns to adopt and implement policy of and for
Ostlei International and for Ostlei Property Development and to conduct the business of each
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company only in accordance with and pursuant to the requirements as set forth in paragraph 59 of
this Complaint.
9.

On his NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF, for a temporary restraining order and a

preliminary injunction during the pendency of this action enjoining Defendants, their successors
and assigns all as provided in paragraph 61 of this Complaint. Further, for a permanent
injunction to be issued at the conclusion hereof enjoining the Defendants, their successors and
any assigns all as provided in paragraph 61, and from causing or permitting, without the written
mutual approval and consent of Dale Ostler and Plaintiff or Plaintiff s successors and assigns, the
adoption or implementation of any policy of Ostler International and of Ostler Property
Development or the causing of Ostler International or Ostler Property Development to engage in
or conduct its business without the mutual approval and consent of Dale Ostler or any of his
assigns, and of Plaintiff or his successors and assigns.
10.

On ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF for costs of court and such further relief as the

Court may deem proper in the premises.
DATED this

tctk

/£

day of December, 2004.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Plaintiffs Address:
Douglas L. Stowell, Esq.
307 East Stanton Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Tab 4

731

COMMENTARY

338

the trust agreement and the shares must be registered in the Model Act had never expressly validated shareholder agreename of the trustee. Typically, the trust agreement provides ments.
that all attributes of beneficial ownership other than the
Rather than relying on further uncertain and sporadic
power to vote are retained by the beneficial owners. In development of the law in the courts, section 732, which was
addition, the voting trustees may issue to the beneficial , added to the Model Act in 1991, rejects the older line of cases.
owners voting trust certificates which may be transferable in It adds an important element of predictability previously
absent from the Model Act and affords participants in closelymuch the same way as shares.
Upon the creation of the voting trust, the trustees must held corporations greater contractual freedom to tailor the
prepare a list of the beneficial owners and deliver it, together rules of their enterprise. The drafters have elected to add
with a copy of the agreement, to the corporation's principal section 732 of the Model Act to the Revised Act.
office, where both documents are available for inspection by
Section 732 is not intended to establish or legitimize an
shareholders under section 720, This simple disclosure re- alternative form of corporation. Instead, it is intended to add,
quirement eliminates the possibility that the voting trust may within the context of the traditional corporate structure, legal
be used to create "secret, uncontrolled combinations of stock- certainty to shareholder agreements that embody various
holders to acquire control of the corporation to the possible aspects of the business arrangement established by the sharedetriment of non-participating shareholders." Lehrman v. holders to meet their business and personal needs. The subject
matter of these arrangements includes governance of the
Cohen, 222 A.2d 800, 807 (Del. 1966).
The purpose of section 730 is not to impose narrow or / entity, allocation of the economic return from the business,
technical requirements on voting trusts. For example, a voting ' and other aspects of the relationships among shareholders,
trust that by its terms extends beyond the 10-year maximum directors and the corporation which are part of the business
should be treated as being valid for the maximum permissible arrangement. Section 732 also recognizes that many of the
corporate norms contained in the Model Act (and Revised Act),
term of 10 years.
as well as the corporation statutes of most states, were
b. Extension or Renewal of Voting Trust.
designed with an eye towards public companies, where manSection 730(3) permits a voting trust to be extended for agement and share ownership are quite distinct. Cf. 1 O'Neal
successive terms of up to 10 years, commencing with the date & Thompson, O'Neal's Close Corporations, section 5.06 (3d
the first shareholder signs the extension agreement. Share- ed.). These functions are often conjoined in the close corporaholders who do not agree to an extension are entitled to the tion. Thus, section 732 validates for nonpublic corporations
return of their shares upon the expiration of the original term. various types of agreements among shareholders even when
the agreements are inconsistent with the statutory norms
731. Voting Agreements
contained in the Model Act and Revised Act.
Section 731(1) explicitly recognizes agreements among two
Importantly, section 732 only addresses the parties to the
or more shareholders as to the voting of shares and makes
clear that these agreements are not subject to the rules shareholder agreement, their transferees, and the corporarelating to a voting trust. These agreements are often referred tion, and does not have any binding legal effect on the state,
to as "pooling agreements." The only formal requirements are creditors, or other third persons.
Section 732 supplements the other provisions of the Model
that they be in writing and signed by all the participating
shareholders; in other respects their validity is to be judged as Act and Revised Act. If an agreement is not in conflict with
any other contract. They are not subject to the 10-year another section of the Revised Act, no resort need be made to
section 732, with its requirement of unanimity. For example,
limitation applicable to voting trusts.
Section 731(2) provides that voting agreements may be special provisions can be included in the articles of incorporaspecifically enforceable. A voting agreement may provide its tion or bylaws with less than unanimous shareholder agreeown enforcement mechanism, as by the appointment of a ment so long as such provisions are not in conflict with other
proxy to vote all shares subject to the agreement; the appoint- provisions of the Revised Act. Similarly, section 732 would not
ment may be made irrevocable under section 722. If no have to be relied upon to validate typical buy-sell agreements
enforcement mechanism is provided, a court may order spe- among two or more shareholders or the covenants and other
cific enforcement of the agreement and order the votes cast as terms of a stock purchase agreement entered into in connecthe agreement contemplates. This section recognizes that tion with the issuance of shares by a corporation.
The types of provisions validated by section 732 are many
damages are not likely to be an appropriate remedy for breach
of a voting agreement, and also avoids the result reached in and varied. Section 732(1) defines the range of permissible
Ringling Bros. Barnam & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, subject matter for shareholder agreements largely by illustraA.2d 441 (Del. 1947), where the court held that the appropri- tion, enumerating seven types of agreements that are exate remedy to enforce a pooling agreement was to refuse to pressly validated to the extent they would not be valid absent
section 732. The enumeration of these types of agreements is
permit any voting of the breaching party's shares.
not exclusive; nor should it give rise to a negative inference
732. Shareholder Agreements
that an agreement of a type that is or might be embraced by
f Shareholders of closely-held corporations, ranging from one of the categories of section 732(1) is, ipso facto, a type of
family businesses to joint ventures owned by large public agreement that is not valid unless it complies with section
corporations, frequently enter into agreements that govern 732. Section 732(1) also contain a "catch all" which adds a
the operation of the enterprise. In the past, various types of measure of flexibility to the seven enumerated categories.
Sshareholder agreements were invalidated by courts for a
Omitted from the enumeration in section 732(1) is a provivariety of reasons, including so-called "sterilization" of the sion found in the Close Corporation Supplement and in the
board of directors and failure to follow the statutory norms of statutes of many of the states, broadly validating any arrangethe applicable corporation act. See, e.g., Long Park, Inc. v. ment the effect of which is to treat the corporation as a
Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d partnership. This type of provision was considered to be too
633 (1948). The more modern decisions reflect a greater elastic and indefinite, as well as unnecessary in light of the
willingness to uphold shareholder agreements. See, e.g., more detailed enumeration of permissible subject areas conGaller v. Galler, 32 111. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964). In tained in section 732(1). Note, however, that under section
addition, many state corporation acts now contain provisions 732(6) the fact that an agreement authorized by section 732(1)
validating shareholder agreements. Earlier versions of the or its performance treats the corporation as a partnership is
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not a ground for imposing personal liability on the parties if
the agreement is otherwise authorized by subsection (1)
a Section 732(1)
Subsection (1) is the heart of section 732 It states that
certain types of agreements are effective among the shareholders and the corporation even if inconsistent with another
provision of the Revised Act Thus, an agreement authorized
by section 732 is, by virtue of that section, "not inconsistent
with law within the meaning of sections 202(2)(b) and 206(2)
of the Revised Act In contrast, a shareholder agreement that
is not inconsistent with any provisions of the Revised Act is
not subject to the requirements of section 732
The range of agreements validated by section 732(1) is
expansive, though not unlimited The most difficult problem
encountered in crafting a shareholder agreement validation
provision is to determine the reach of the provision Some
states have tried to articulate the limits of a shareholder
agreement validation provision in terms of negative grounds,
stating that no shareholder agreement shall be invalid on
certain specified grounds See eg Del Code Ann Tit 8,
sections 350 354 (1983) NC Gen Stat section 5573(b)(1982) The deficiencv in this type of statute is the
uncertainty introduced bv the ever present possibility of
articulating another ground on which to challenge the validity
of the agreement Other states have provided that shareholder
agreements may waive or alter all provisions in the corporation act except certain enumerated provisions that cannot be
varied See eg Cal Corp Code section 300(b)-(c) (West 1989
and Supp 1990) The difficulty with this approach is that any
enumeration of the provisions that can never be varied will
almost inevitably be subjective arbitrary, and incomplete
The approach chosen in section 732 is more pragmatic It
defines the types of agreements that can be validated largeiv
by illustration The seven specific categories that are listed are
designed to cover the most frequently used arrangements The
outer boundary is provided by section 732(1 )(h) which provides an additional 'catch all" for any provisions that, in a
manner inconsistent with any other provision of the Revised
Act, otherwise govern the exercise of the corporate powers, the
management of the business and affairs of the corporation, or
the relationship between and among the shareholders, the
directors, and the corporation or any of them Section 732(1)
validates virtually all types of shareholder agreements that,
m practice normally concern shareholders and their advisors
Given the breadth of section 732(1), any provision that may
be contained in the articles of incorporation with a majority
•ote under sections 202(2)(b)(i) and (n), as well as under
•ection 841 may also be effective if contained in a shareholder
•greement that complies with section 732
The provisions of a shareholder agreement authorized by
•ection 732(1) will often, in operation, conflict with the literal
language of more than one section of the Revised Act, and
courts should in such cases construe all related sections of the
Revised Act flexibly and in a manner consistent with the
underlying intent of the shareholder agreement Thus, for
Sample, in the case of an agreement that provides for
lighted voting by directors, every reference in the Revised
*& to a majority or other proportion of directors should be
construed to refer to a majority or other proportion of the votes
•»the directors
^ While the outer limits of the catch-all provision of subsection 732Q)(h) are left uncertain, there are provisions of the
Raised Act that cannot be overridden by resort to the catch•jL Subsection (l)(h), introduced by the term "otherwise," is
intended to be read in context with the preceding seven
Resections and to be subject to a ejusdem generis rule of
'instruction Thus, in defining the outer limits, courts should
,e°nsider whether the variation from the Revised Act under
^nsideration is similar to the variations permitted by the first
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seven subsections Subsection (l)(h) is also subject to a public
policy limitation, in tended to give courts express authority to
restrict the scope of the catch-all where there are substantial
issues of public policy at stake For example, a shareholder
agreement that provides that the directors of the corporation
have no duties of care or loyalty to the corporation or the
shareholders would not be within the purview of section
732(l)(h), because it is not sufficiently similar to the types of
arrangements suggested by the first seven subsections of
section 732(1) and because such a provision could be viewed as
contrary to a public policy of substantial importance Similarly, a provision that exculpates directors from Lability more
broadly than permitted by section 841 likely would not be
validated under section 732, because as the commentary to
section 841 states, there are serious public policy reasons
which support the few limitations that remain on the right to
exculpate directors from liability Further development of the
outer limits is left, however, for the courts
As noted above shareholder agreements otherwise validated by section 732 are not legally binding on the state on
creditors, or on other third parties For example an agreement that dispenses with the need to make corporate filings
required by the Revised Act would be ineffective Similarly, an
agreement among shareholders that provides that only the
president has authority to enter into contracts for the corporation would not, without more be binding against third
parties, and ordinary principles of agencv, including the concept of apparent authority, would continue to apply
b Section 732(2)
Section 732 minimizes the formal requirements for a shareholder agreement so as not to restrict unduly the sharehold
ers ability to take advantage of the flexibility the section
provides Thus unldce comparable provisions in special close
corporation legislation, it is not necessary to "opt in" to a
special class of close corporations in order to obtain the
benefits of section 732 An agreement can be validated under
section 732 whether it is set forth m the articles of incorporation the bylaws cr in a separate agreement and whether or
not section 732 is specifically referenced in the agreement The
principal requirements aresimply that the agreement be m
wnting and be approved or agreed to by all persons who are
then shareholder? Where the corporation has a single share
holder, the requirement of an "agreement among the shareholders'' is satisfied by the unilateral action of the shareholder
in establishing the terms of the agreement, evidenced by
provisions in the articles or bylaws, or in a writing signed by
the sole shareholder Although a writing signed by all the
shareholders is not required where the agreement is contamed
in articles of incorporation or bylaws unanimously approved,
it may be desirable to have all the shareholders actually sign
the instrument in order to establish unequivocally their agreement Similarly, while transferees are bound by a valid shareholder agreement, it may be desirable to obtain the affirmative
wntten assent of the transferee at the time of the transfer
Subsection (2) also established and permits amendments by
less than unanimous agreement if the shareholder agreement
so provides
Section 732(2 requires unanimous shareholder approval
regardless of entitlement to vote Unanimity is required
because an agreement authorized by section 732 can effect
material organic changes m the corporation's operation and
structure, and in the rights and obligations of shareholders
The requirement that the shareholder agreement be made
known to the corporation is the predicate for the requirement
in subsection (3) that share certificates or information statements be legended to note the existence of the agreement No
specific form of notification is required and the agreement
need not be filed with the corporation In the case of shareholder agreements m the articles or bylaws, the corporation
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will necessarily have notice. In the case of shareholder agreements outside the articles or bylaws, the requirement of
signature by all of the shareholders will in virtually all cases
be sufficient to constitute notification to the corporation, as
one or more signatories will normally also be a director or an
officer.
c. Section 732(3).
Section 732(3) addresses the effect of a shareholder agreement on subsequent purchasers or transferees of shares.
Typically, corporations with shareholder agreements also have
restrictions on the transferability of the shares as authorized
by section 627 of the Revised Act, thus lessening the practical
effects of the problem in the context of voluntary transferees.
Transferees of shares without knowledge of the agreement or
those acquiring shares upon the death of an original participant in a close corporation may, however, be heavily impacted.
Weighing the burdens on transferees against the burdens on
the remaining shareholders in the enterprise, section 732(3)
affirms the continued validity of the shareholder agreement on
all transferees, whether by purchase, gift, operation of law, or
otherwise. Unlike restrictions on transfer, it may be impossible to enforce a shareholder agreement against less than all o
the shareholders. Thus, under section 732, one who inherit!
shares subject to a shareholder agreement must continue to
abide by the agreement. If that is not the desired result, care
must be exercised at the initiation of the shareholder agreement to ensure a different outcome, such as providing for a
buy-back upon death.
Where shares are transferred to a purchaser without knowledge of a shareholder agreement, the validity of the agreement
is similarly unaffected, but the purchaser is afforded a rescission remedy against the seller. The term "purchaser" imports
consideration. Under subsection (3) the time at which notice to
a purchaser is relevant for purposes of determining entitlement to rescission is the time when a purchaser acquires the
shares rather than when a commitment is made to acquire the
shares. If the purchaser learns of the agreement after becoming committed to purchase but before the acquisition of the
shares, the purchaser should not be permitted to proceed with
the purchase and still obtain the benefits of the remedies in
section 732(3). Moreover, under contract principles and the
securities laws a failure to disclose the existence of a shareholder agreement would in most cases constitute the omission
of a material fact and may excuse performance of the commitment to purchase. The term purchaser includes a person
acquiring shares upon initial issue or by transfer, and also
includes a pledgee, for whom the time of purchase is the time
the shares are pledged.
Section 732 addresses the underlying rights that accrue to
shares and shareholders and the validity of shareholder action
which redefines those rights, as contrasted with questions
regarding entitlement to ownership of the security, competing
ownership claims, and disclosure issues. Consistent with this
dichotomy, the rights and remedies available to purchasers
under section 732(3) are independent of those provided by
contract law, article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the
securities laws and others outside the Revised Act. With
respect to the related subject of restrictions on transferability
of shares, note that section 732 does not directly address or
validate such restrictions, which are governed instead by
section 627 of the Act. However, if such restrictions are
adopted as a part of a shareholder agreement that complies
with the requirements of section 732, a court should construe
broadly the concept of reasonableness under section 627 in
determining the validity of such restrictions.
Section 732(3) contains an affirmative requirement that the
share certificate or information statement for the shares be
legended to note the existence of a shareholder agreement. No
specified form of legend is required, and a simple statement
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that "ft]he shares represented by this certificate are subject to
a shareholder agreement" is sufficient. At that point a purchaser must obtain a copy of the shareholder agreement from
the transferor or proceed at the purchaser's peril. In the event
a corporation fails to legend share certificates or information
statements, a court may, in an appropriate case, imply a cause
of action against the corporation in favor of an injured purchaser without knowledge of a shareholder agreement. The
circumstances under which such a remedy would be implied,
the proper measure of damages, and other attributes of and
limitations on such an implied remedy are left to development
in the courts.
If the purchaser has no actual knowledge of a shareholder
agreement, and is not charged with knowledge by virtue of a
legend on the certificate or information statement, the purchaser has a rescission remedy against the transferor (which
would be the corporation in the case of a new issue of shares).
While the statutory rescission remedy provided in subsection
(3) is nonexclusive, it is intended to be a purchaser's primary
remedy.
If the shares are certificated and duly legended, a purchaser
is charged with notice of the shareholder agreement even if
the purchaser never saw the certificate. Thus, a purchaser is
exposed to risk if the purchaser does not ask to see the
certificate at or prior to the purchase of the shares. In the case
of uncertificated shares, however, the purchaser is not charged
with notice of the shareholder agreement unless a dulylegended information statement is delivered to the purchaser
at or prior to the time of purchase. This different rule for
uncertificated shares is intended to provide an additional
safeguard to protect innocent purchasers, and is necessary
because section 626(2) of the Revised Act and section 8-408 of
the U.C.C. permit delivery of information statements after a
transfer of shares.
d. Section 732(4).
Section 732(4) contains a self-executing termination provision for a shareholder agreement when the shares of the
corporation become publicly held. The statutory norms in the
Revised Act become more necessary and appropriate as the
number of shareholders increases, as there is greater opportunity to acquire or dispose of an investment in the corporation, and as there is less opportunity for negotiation over the
terms under which the enterprise will be conducted. Given
that section 732 requires unanimity, however, in most cases a
practical limit on the availability of a shareholder agreement
will be reached before a public market develops. Subsection (4)
rejects the use of an absolute number of shareholders in
determining when the shelter of section 732 is lost.
Section 732(5) through (7) contain a number of technical
provisions. Subsection (5) provides a shift of liability from the
directors to any person or persons in whom the discretion or
powers otherwise exercised by the board of directors are
vested. A shareholder agreement which provides for such a
shift of responsibility, with the concomitant shift of liability
provided by subsection (5), could also provide for exculpation
from that liability to the extent otherwise authorized by the
Revised Act. The transfer of liability provided by subsection
(5) covers liabilities imposed on directors "by law," which is
intended to include liabilities arising under the Revised Act,
the common law, and statutory law outside the Revised Act.
Nevertheless, there could be cases where subsection (5) is
ineffective and where a director is exposed to liability qua
director, even though under a shareholder agreement the
director may have given up some or all of the powers normally
exercised by directors.
Subsection (6), based on the Close Corporation Supplement
of the Model Act and the Texas statute, narrows the grounds
for imposing personal liability on shareholders for the liabilities of a corporation for acts or omissions authorized by a
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shareholder agreement validated by section 732 Subsection
(7) addresses shareholder agreements for corporations that
are in the process of being organized and do not yet have
shareholders
The Revised Act does not, of course, address the tax status
of a corporation formed under the Revised Act When an
unorthodox arrangement is established pursuant to a shareholder agreement authorized by section 732, that corporation
could in some circumstances be deemed a partnership for tax
purposes an issue to which counsel should be attuned, but
which is not addressed in the Revised Act See Treas Reg
section 301 7701-1 (as amended in 1977), Rev Rul 88-76,
1988 2 C B 360 (company organized pursuant to Wyoming
Limited Liability Company statute, classified for federal tax
purposes as a partnership)
Subpart D
Derivative Proceedings
740. Procedure in Derivative Proceedings
The Model Act was amended in 1990 to include a series of
sections providing detailed procedures and requirements for
shareholder derivative suits The new provisions reflect a
reappraisal of issues such as (a) whether demand upon the
board of directors is required, and lb) the power of independent directors to dismiss a derivative suit
A great deal of controversy has surrounded the derivative
suit, and widely different perceptions continue to exist as to
the efficacy of such litigation It was beyond the scope of the
effort undertaken by the Utah Business Corporation Act
Revision Committee to analyze the various issues surrounding
shareholder derivative suits or to suggest a solution to those
issues The drafters felt the issue would be better addressed
by a more focused effort conducted bv a group representing the
various interests typically involved in such suits We would
encourage a future review of the issues surrounding derivative suits and consideration of the desirability of implementing the procedures and requirements imposed in the Model
Act The enactment of new procedures would require appropnate modifications of Rule 23 1 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure
Section 740 follows the Model Act language that was superseded by the recent modifications to the Model Act This
language is patterned in part after the procedures applicable
to derivative actions as set forth in Rule 23 1 of both the
Federal and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure The Revised Act
specifies that the Utah rule is applicable to derivative actions
covered by Section 740
a Procedural Requirements
The procedural requirements imposed by section 740 are as
follows
1 The plaintiff may be either a registered or beneficial
owner of shares
Manv statutes including early versions of the Model Act,
Squired the plaintiff to be a shareholder "of record " This
Uniting requirement was dropped in revising section 740, in
Kght of the widespread use of street name or nominee ownership of shares At the same time, it was determined that the
beneficial owner of shares held in a voting trust should also be
Permitted to serve as a plaintiff m a derivative suit These
Ganges were accomplished by the addition of a special deflation of shareholder" in subsection (6) to broaden the deflation of that term m section 102
2 The plaintiff must have been an owner of shares at
the time of the transaction in question
. 'Hie Model Act and the statutes of many states have long
°nposed a ""contemporaneous ownership'* rule, l e , the plain-
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tiff must have been an owner of shares at the time of the
transaction in question This rule has been cnticized as being
unduly narrow and technical and unnecessary to prevent the
transfer or purchase of lawsuits A few states, particularly
California, Cal G C L Section 800(B), have relaxed this rule
to the extent of allowing some subsequent purchasers of
shares to be plaintiffs in limited circumstances
The decision to retaia the contemporaneous ownership rule
in section 740 was based primarily on the view that it was
simple, clear, and easy to apply while the California approach
might encourage htigal ion on peripheral issues like the extent
of the plaintiff's knowledge of the transaction in question
when the shares were acquired Further, there has been no
persuasive showing that the contemporaneous ownership rule
has prevented the litigation of substantial suits since there
appear to be many persons who might qualify as plaintiffs to
bring suit even if subsequent purchasers are disqualified
3 The complaint must be verified
Section 740(2) requires the complaint in a derivative suit to
be verified, i e, sworn to Compare Federal Rules of Civri
Procedure, Rule 23 1, Surowitz u Hilton Hotels Corp, 383
U S 363 (1966) This requirement provides some protection
against groundless litigation without deterring suits brought
in good faith
4 Option holders and convertible debenture holders
are not permitted to sue
Arguments may be made that long-term creditors and
investors with the privilege of becoming shareholders by the
exercise of options or conversion rights should be permitted to
bring derivative suits These arguments, however, appear to
involve the substantive rights of these various classes of
investors more than the procedures required for the assertion
of derivative rights on behalf of the corporation See e g
Hamv Kerkor wn, 32 i A 2d 215 (Del Ch 1974), rev'd in part,
347 A 2d 133 (Del 1975) Therefore section 740(1) does not
permit option holders or convertible debenture holders to
serve as derivative plaintiffs
5 There must be prior notice and demand on directors
in most circumstances
The purpose of a demand on the board of directors is to
stimulate the ooard of directors to enforce the rights of the
corporation on its own Modern trends in corporate governance, particularly the increasing number of outside directors
and greater director sensitivity to their roles in the corporation and to the possibility of personal liability, improve the
likelihood that the board of directors will weigh carefully the
shareholder's demand Therefore, section 740(2) requires an
allegation with particularity of the demand made, if any, on
the board of directors On the other hand, there may be
circumstances showing that a demand on the board of direc
tors would be useless and in those circumstances it should be
sufficient to allege the reasons why the plaintiff did not make
the demand
Of itself, the reje:tion by the board of directors of the
shareholder's demand neither permits nor precludes the
shareholder's suit
6 A court may stay a derivative suit while the board of
directors investigates
The last sentence of section 740(2) provides that if the
corporation undertakes an investigation, the court may stay
the proceeding until the investigation of the charges made in
the demand or complaint is completed The purpose of this
stay is to preserve the right of the board of directors to
consider whether or not to seek to enforce on its own the
corporation's claim
7 Recovery of reasonable expenses of suit, including
attorneys' iees, if suit brought without good cause

